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ON VERDICTS
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Eric Jacobs
When police officers are charged with illegal use of force, jurors’ pre-existing attitudes
toward the police can shape how jurors interpret trial evidence: Was the officer just doing his job
under high amounts of pressure while fearing for his life? Or did the officer abuse his power with
disregard for the victim’s life? The language in jury instructions, however, might reduce or
exacerbate the effect of jurors’ attitudes toward police on their verdict decisions. In an
experimental mock-jury study, the content of jury instructions was manipulated to be consistent
with an objective standard of reasonableness (i.e., Tennessee v. Garner, 1985) or a subjective
standard of reasonableness (Graham v. Connor, 1989), along with a control condition with no
police-specific language. I predicted that, compared to control instructions, objective standards
would weaken, and subjective standards would strengthen, the influence of attitudes on verdicts.
Attitudes toward police were measured as a continuous predictor and were counterbalanced
before and after the trial. An online sample of individual mock-jurors (N = 539) viewed a trial
presentation in which a police officer was charged with first-degree murder for illegal use of
force. The importance of prosecution evidence and the extent to which they took the officer’s
perspective were potential mediators of the relationship between attitudes and verdicts. As
predicted, jurors’ negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted the importance of
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking. In turn, the importance of prosecution evidence
i

and perspective-taking predicted juror’s perceptions of officer guilt. Instruction content was not a
successful moderator of the relationship between attitudes and verdicts. The effect of attitudes on
verdicts in fatal police use of force trials has important implications for the psychological study
of jury decision-making, and for the criminal justice system as a whole.
Key Words: fatal police use of force; attitudes; attitudes toward police; juror verdict
decisions; jury instructions; subjective and objective standards.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, Dr. Liana Peter-Hagene, for her support and
encouragement throughout this project, and throughout my training in graduate school. She is
one of the most brilliant and remarkable women I have ever known, and it has been a true
privilege to grow under her mentorship and guidance. I am a stronger scholar because of the time
she invested in me, and I am forever grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Eric Jacobs for his
consistent support and guidance throughout my graduate school career. My appreciation also
goes out to my committee members, Dr.’s Scott Comparato, Randall Davis, and Tammy Kochel
for their thoughtful and helpful feedback throughout the dissertation process.
I owe a debt of gratitude to all my lab mates for their unconditional support and
encouragement, and for spending their valuable time helping me develop and test the materials
for this project. A special thanks is owed to Deidre Davis for the countless hours she spent
researching and documenting fatal police use of force cases. I feel so fortunate to have developed
friendships with so many amazing people during my time at SIU and I will always treasure the
hours I spent sharing food and ideas (and plenty of cute animal pics) with my colleagues in ARC
and with my lab mates.
In the spirit of Mister Rogers, I would like to close by thanking some important people
who “loved me into being.” Thank you to my parents and grandparents—biological and not, here
and gone—for loving me and believing in me. I would not be the person I am today without the
love, support, and laughter that I share with my sisters, and my sister-friends. I am grateful for
the loving support and encouragement of my partner, Nathan; we are truly the lucky ones.
Finally, I am thankful for my children, Madison, and Mason. They are the force that drives me,
and they have taught me everything I know about all the most important things in life.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................vii
CHAPTERS
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction............................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review .................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER 3 – Method .................................................................................................. 26
CHAPTER 4 – Results .................................................................................................. 37
CHAPTER 5 – Discussion ............................................................................................. 49
CHAPTER 6 – Conclusion ............................................................................................ 62
EXHIBITS ................................................................................................................................ 63
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 77
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A – Eligibility and Consent ........................................................................ 92
APPENDIX B – Attitudes Toward Police ...................................................................... 94
APPENDIX C – Pre-Trial Instructions .......................................................................... 95
APPENDIX D – Trial Stimulus .................................................................................... 98
APPENDIX E – Post-Trial Instructions ...................................................................... 104
APPENDIX F – Dependent Measures ......................................................................... 106
APPENDIX G – The Importance of Prosecution Evidence .......................................... 107

iv

APPENDIX H – Perspective-Taking .......................................................................... 108
APPENDIX I – Memory for Case Facts....................................................................... 109
APPENDIX J – Manipulation Check ........................................................................... 110
APPENDIX K – Conceptual Manipulation Check ....................................................... 111
APPENDIX L – Suspicion Item .................................................................................. 112
APPENDIX M – Demographics .................................................................................. 113
APPENDIX N – Debriefing......................................................................................... 115
VITA .................................................................................................................................... 116

v

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

Table 1 - Overall Sample Demographics ................................................................................... 69
Table 2 - Means for Continuous Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator Across
Experimental Conditions ............................................................................................ 70
Table 3 - Correlations Among Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator .................. 71
Table 4 - Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and
Instructions on Dichotomous Verdicts with Control Instructions as Indicator .............. 72
Table 5 - Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and
Instructions on Dichotomous Verdicts with Superseding Moment Instructions as
Indicator ..................................................................................................................... 74
Table 6 - Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and
Instructions on Dichotomous Verdicts with Control Instructions as Indicator .............. 75
Table 7 - Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and
Instructions on Dichotomous Verdicts with Superseding Moment Instructions as
Indicator ..................................................................................................................... 76

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1 - The Hypothesized Effect of Instruction Content and Positive Attitudes Toward the
Police on Guilty Verdicts .......................................................................................... 63
Figure 2 - Path Diagram for the Predicted Moderated Mediation Model .................................... 64
Figure 3 - Fully Standardized CFA estimates ............................................................................ 65
Figure 4 - The Effect of Instruction Content and Positive Attitudes Toward the Police
on Guilty Verdicts .................................................................................................... 66
Figure 5 - Path Diagram Depicting Moderated Mediation Results: Control Reference ............... 67
Figure 6 - Path Diagram Depicting Moderated Mediation Results: Superseding Reference ........ 68

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, public trust in the police has continually decreased as high-profile police
killings of unarmed Black men came to the forefront of public discourse and media coverage
(McLaughlin, 2015; Park, 2018). Many community members believe the legal system does not
hold police officers accountable, as prosecutors rarely bring charges against police officers in
fatal use of force cases (Stinson, 2019). However, when police officers are brought to trial for
unjustified use of fatal force and the issue is put back in the hands of the public (i.e., jurors),
outcomes do not reflect a clear bias in favor of police officers. Archival analysis of actual jury
trials of police officers criminally charged for fatal on-duty shootings since 2005 showed
verdicts to be nearly evenly split down the middle (Ratliff, Peter-Hagene, Davis, & Rajayah,
unpublished manuscript). Given the divided nature of public reactions, it is important to learn
how important jurors’ attitudes toward the police are to their verdict decisions, regardless of case
facts. Jurors in fatal use of force trials might be susceptible to the influence of their own preexisting attitudes about police. Can the potential influence of jurors’ attitudes be minimized or
exacerbated by the legal instructions jurors are given when determining their verdicts?
Furthermore, do specific types of jury instructions influence the relationship between jurors’ preexisting attitudes toward police and verdicts by distorting their interpretation of the evidence, or
by encouraging them to consider the events from the officer’s perspective?
Although the strength of the evidence is generally the best predictor of verdicts in most
trials (Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & Stolle, 2009), jurors’ attitudes toward police
(i.e., their general trust or distrust of police) might influence verdicts in fatal use of force trials.
According to the story model of jury decision making, jurors naturally organize evidence in
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terms of a cause and effect narrative, filling in any ambiguous gaps on their own (Pennington &
Hastie, 1981; 1988; 1993). For example, Carlson & Russo (2001) found that jurors in a mock
civil negligence trial selectively attended to and evaluated new information according to their
pre-trial attitudes toward “typical” plaintiffs and defendants in such cases. Jurors who had
positive (versus negative) attitudes toward typical civil defendants distorted the evidence in favor
of the defense, while jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward plaintiffs distorted
evidence in favor of the prosecution. Because pre-existing beliefs tend to provide the narrative
framework for how jurors interpret evidence and instructions (Pennington & Hastie, 1981;
Ellsworth, 1993), jurors’ pre-trial attitudes toward police might similarly influence judgments
and decision-making in fatal police use of force trials.
Language and phrasing variations in jury instructions might influence verdicts directly, or
by reducing or enhancing the effect of pre-trial attitudes. Two Supreme Court rulings
recommend very different types of instructions, yet neither of them has been tested empirically
to assess their effects, if any, on verdicts. In Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor
(1989), the Supreme Court defined the “reasonableness standard” by which the behavior of
police officers charged with excessive or fatal use of force should be judged. The 1985 Garner
decision provided a specific list of factors to consider in determining whether the totality of
circumstances justified a particular use of force (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent
persons from officer behavior, presence/absence of deadly weapon, whether warning was given,
etc.). Four years later, the 1989 Graham ruling brought into focus the superseding moment, or the
very narrow point in time during which an officer decides to use deadly force (e.g., “…police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving...”). Thus, the Justice System is compelled to comply with
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Supreme Court precedent, and as such, must incorporate the language provided in Connor and
Graham into jury instructions in fatal use of force trials. However, jury instructions in actual
police use of force trials are ultimately left to the discretion of presiding judges and, as a result,
incorporation of the language from Connor and Graham has varied drastically across
jurisdictions.
A review of jury pattern instructions—available online from all US Appellate Courts,
except the Second and Fourth Circuits—uncovered substantial inconsistencies in how the
guidelines for evaluating excessive and fatal police use of force have been explained to jurors.
Specifically, some pattern instructions incorporated language from Graham, others incorporated
language from Garner, and others contained a combination of language from both. These
inconsistencies have significant implications for the uniform and unbiased administration of
justice because the language in these instructions might have psychological implications for how
jurors process evidence in cases involving police officers as defendants. Importantly, research
illustrates that jury instructions might increase the predictive power of attitudes for verdicts in
some situations (Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017) and decrease the predictive power in other
situations (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991). Although it is not easy to change people’s attitudes about
police, it is possible to influence the mindset (i.e., a way of thinking about or approaching a task)
with which jurors approach evaluating evidence (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2008). Furthermore,
instructing or encouraging participants to think in specific ways can affect behavioral outcomes
(Yeager & Dweck, 2012).
Jury instructions adapted from the Graham ruling (i.e., superseding moment) guide jurors
to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness in their decision-making process. Subjective
reasonableness standards lead to greater reliance on existing attitudes and shallow information
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processing (Epstein, 1994), which might lead jurors to focus on attitude-congruent evidence (i.e.,
defense evidence for pro-police jurors and prosecution evidence for anti-police jurors).
Importantly, instructing jurors to adopt subjective (versus objective) standards of reasonableness
leads to fewer guilty verdicts (Terrance, Matheson, & Spanos, 2000). Additionally, superseding
moment instructions (Graham, 1989) guide jurors to view the shooting event from the officer’s
perspective. Given that jurors who engage in such perspective-taking are more likely to express
empathy for defendants and less likely to find them guilty (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000;
Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014), this type of instruction might shift
verdicts in favor of police officers. Moreover, it is also possible that Graham-based instructions
could influence verdicts by focusing juror’s attention on the very narrow moment in which force
was used rather than the entirety of circumstance.
In contrast to superseding moment instructions, instructions adapted from the 1985
Garner decision (i.e., totality of circumstance) advise jurors to consider several relatively
objective factors when determining whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable. The list of
specific factors in totality of circumstance instructions might induce an objective mindset, and
thus, prompt jurors to engage in a more deliberate and unbiased evaluation of the evidence.
Furthermore, unlike the split-second focus of the superseding moment instructions, totality of
circumstance instructions guide jurors to consider the entire chain of events before, during, and
after the shooting incident. Hence, the goal of the present research was to empirically test
whether common language variations in jury instruction content resulted in disparate verdict
outcomes across conditions in which jurors with positive or negative attitudes toward police
evaluated evidence from a fatal police shooting trial.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Influence of Attitudes on Jurors’ Decision Making
Attitudes and jurors’ judgments. To understand jurors’ judgments in fatal use of force
cases, it is first necessary to consider the influence of jurors’ pre-existing attitudes on the way
they make judgments and decisions. Juror’s decisions are generally consistent with that of judges
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Eisenberg et al., 2005) and their verdicts are generally best predicted by
the strength of the evidence. However, jurors do not come into the courtroom as blank slates,
free of any preconceived notions about various types of “good” or “bad” people that inhabit the
social world around them. Rather, people’s cumulative history of positive or negative
experiences with various social groups are likely to shape their attitudes. For example, people’s
prior experience with police and the justice system are likely to shape their attitudes toward
police (Rosenbaum, et al., 2005).
Attitudes can affect behavior like decision-making spontaneously, or the process can be
more deliberative. According to Fazio (2007) the process occurs through an automatic sequence
in which attitudes are activated by situational factors and then come to promote selective
processing of attitude-congruent information. Hence, a person’s attitude about any given social
object is likely to shape how they process new information related to that object, and to prepare
people to perceive events that are consistent with their beliefs (Roskos-Ewoldwon & Fazio,
1992; Fazio, Roskos-Ewoldwon, & Owell, 1994). When a person encounters the attitude object,
the attitude becomes activated to a level of accessibility that increases the likelihood that the
attitude will affect how subsequent information is interpreted. For example, when people
encounter a police officer defendant, their general attitudes toward police are likely to become
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more readily accessible in memory.
Furthermore, when attitudes are based on direct personal experience, they are more easily
accessible, and thus, more likely to influence behavior (Regan & Fazio, 1977). Therefore, when
people have highly accessible attitudes toward a social object or category (e.g., police officers),
the object is more likely to attract their attention and to provide the framework for how they
perceive and process new information related to that object (e.g., police officer-hero versus
police officer-villain). Alternatively, attitudes can influence behavior through a more deliberate
process. For example, reasoned action approaches (Ajzen, 1991, 2012; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)
suggest that attitudes toward a given behavior, perceived social norms, and perceived behavioral
control all contribute to the development of a person’s intentions. In turn, a person’s intentions
are predictive of their behavior. Attitudes are more likely to influence behavior when individuals
have stable (Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000) and well-rehearsed (Erber, Hodges, & Wilson,
1995; Wyer & Srull, 1989) attitudes.
Prior evidence suggests that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward police might have a
substantial influence on the way jurors perceive and interpret evidence and jury instructions
during trials with police officer defendants (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Ellsworth, 1993; Pennington
& Hastie, 1981; 1988; 1993). For instance, Carlson & Russo (2001) found that mock jurors in a
civil negligence trial selectively attended to and evaluated new information according to their
pre-trial attitudes. More specifically, jurors who had positive (versus negative) attitudes toward
“typical” civil defendants distorted the evidence in favor of the defense. In contrast, jurors with
positive (versus negative) attitudes toward prosecutors distorted the evidence in favor of the
prosecution. Therefore, in a complex trial, where both sides offer evidence to support their
claims and where the “correct” verdict is not immediately obvious, jurors with positive attitudes
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toward police might be likely to focus on evidence from the defense and jurors with negative
attitudes toward police might be likely to focus on evidence from the prosecution.
Attitudes toward police. In general, people have at least somewhat positive views of the
police. Specifically, the Pew Research Center (Fingerhut, 2017) found that two-thirds of the
public (64%) rated officers warmly, 16% gave a neutral rating, and just 18% gave a cold rating.
Gallup polls have similarly demonstrated that Americans rank the police as the third highest
institution in which they have confidence, with a majority (54%) reporting a “great deal” of
confidence in police, 31% endorsing “some” confidence, and only 15% reporting “very little or
none” (Saad, 2018). For police to be effective administrators of justice, they must be seen as
legitimate authority figures who are deserving of deference and obedience. The procedural
justice perspective suggests that police gain legitimacy when the processes through which
authority is exercised and decisions are made are perceived to be fair. When people have trust
and confidence in police legitimacy, they are more likely to cooperate with police and to support
policies that empower police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In a recent international review, Jackson
(2018) found that procedural justice continues to be the strongest predictor of people’s subjective
belief about whether an institution is entitled to power and obedience (i.e., police legitimacy).
However, a perceived failure to hold police accountable for wrongful instances of fatal force has
led to poorer assessments of police fairness and legitimacy (Park, 2018), particularly among
communities of color (e.g., for a review, see Peck, 2015).
Several demographic and social characteristics have a robust relationship with attitudes
toward police: race (Park, 2018), social context (Braga, Winship, & Tyler, 2014), neighborhood
context (Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2003; Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2015), and direct
and vicarious contact with the police (Augustyn, 2016; Fine, Cavanagh, Steinberg, Frick, &
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Cauffman, 2016). Some research has shown significant effects of age (Jefferis, et al., 1997;
McLean, Wolfe, & Pratt, 2019), political ideology (e.g., for a review, see Brown & Benedict,
2002), and level of education (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; for a review, see Brown & Benedict,
2002)—with highly educated young people being more skeptical of police legitimacy.
Rosenbaum and colleagues (2005) found that, although direct contact with police in the year
prior did not influence attitudes, learning about another person’s positive or negative experience
with police accordingly shifted attitudes toward police in positive or negative directions.
In contrast to jurors with more skeptical or negative attitudes toward police (e.g., Black
Americans, Weitzer, Tuch, & Skogan, 2008; liberals, Ekins, 2016), jurors with positive attitudes
toward police are more likely to view police officers as guardians—the good guys who are
trained and trusted to carry weapons in defense of the general public. Indeed, the mere presence
of a police officer in uniform seems to have a powerful impact, making people more likely to
accept and comply with orders, no matter how strange (e.g. give a dime to a stranger, Bickman,
1974). Evidence has also shown that police officers wearing traditional (versus more civilianstyled) uniforms are perceived as more competent, honest, helpful, good, more valuable, and
possessing better judgment (Mauro, 1984; Nickels, 2008).
Attitudes toward police use of force. Most studies on perceptions of police use of force
have focused on general attitudes. For example, evidence has shown that a majority of the
general public (60%) believes that fatal police use of force against Black individuals in recent
years is a sign of a broader problem (Morin, Parker, Stepler, Mercer, 2017). Unsurprisingly,
Black Americans (73%) are more likely than White (35%) or Hispanic (54%) Americans to say
that police officers are too quick to use fatal force (Ekins, 2016). However, some social groups
are more supportive of police use of force. For example, political conservatives endorse more
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positive attitudes toward police use of force than do liberals (Ekins, 2016; Gerber & Jackson,
2017; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2004; Stack & Cao, 1998).
Studies investigating people’s reactions to specific use-of-force incidents have increased
over time (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2017; Celestin & Kruschke, 2018; Gerber & Jackson,
2017; Jefferis, Butcher, & Hanley, 2011; Weitzer, 2002). Predictably, people who have positive
attitudes toward police legitimacy are more likely to accept specific instances of fatal use of
force by police (Celestin & Kruschke, 2018). People who identify strongly with certain social
groups (i.e., law-abiding citizens) are also more likely to accept instances of police use of force
than people who do not identify strongly with those social groups, regardless of whether the
force seemed justified or not (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2017). Law enforcement agencies
use decision rules for determining the appropriate level of force police officers should use in
response to various types of dangerous citizen conflict (i.e., force continuum). Celestin and
Kruschke (2019) found that, although police officers are taught to subdue dangerous suspects
with a higher level of force than that which confronts them, the public actually expects police
officers to respond at a level of force that is lower than the threat exhibited by the suspect.
Similarly, Jefferis and colleagues (2011) found that most people believed police officers use too
much force in relation to the level of resistance demonstrated by suspects. Furthermore, results
from a recent analysis of reactions to specific use of force instances from 1990 to 2018
demonstrated that, over time, people have become more disapproving of legally reasonable,
justifiable use of fatal force by police (Mourtgos & Adams, 2019). In the following sections, I
will discuss some theoretical models of how jurors’ pre-existing attitudes can ultimately come to
shape their verdict decisions.
Story model of juror decision making. According to the story model of jury decision-
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making (Pennington & Hastie, 1981; 1988; Ellsworth, 1993), jurors’ beliefs about police might
provide the narrative framework for how jurors interpret evidence and instructions in fatal use of
force cases. Importantly, the cause and effect narrative jurors construct in cases where police
officers used fatal force against a suspect might be shaped by their pre-existing attitudes toward
police. The story model holds that jurors organize trial information (e.g., evidence, attorney
statements, witness statements, etc.) into a narrative account and construct a cause and effect
story to explain what happened. Creating a narrative story enables individual jurors to better
understand the evidence and to decide their initial, pre-deliberation verdict choice. However, in
addition to the evidence presented at trial, jurors rely on their existing knowledge of similar cases
or crimes, and their own general expectations and experiences with case-related issues when
constructing a narrative story of the trial events (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Indeed, Ellsworth
(1993) reported that jurors existing beliefs guide them to construct general “stereotyped themes”
to summarize the trial events. For example, “Hero cop fatally shoots dangerous criminal,” versus
“Reckless cop fatally shoots petty thief.” Jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward
police are more likely to view police officers as the “good guys” (Weitzer, et al., 2008; Ekins,
2016). As such, jurors with positive attitudes toward police who are evaluating a fatal use of
force case would construct a narrative in which the police officer is a hero, doing his duty to stop
a dangerous criminal. In contrast, jurors with negative attitudes toward police would create a
narrative in which the police officer was reckless in shooting a harmless victim.
Cognitive consistency theory of juror decision making. According to cognitive
consistency theories (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Simon, et
al., 2004) people are motivated to seek coherent and consistent attitudes, thoughts, beliefs,
values, feelings, and behaviors. When inconsistencies arise, this produces a state of tension (i.e.,
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dissonance) and motivates the person to reduce the cognitive discomfort. To reduce the tension,
people will work to make their relevant case-related cognitions consistent with their pre-existing
beliefs. Thus, it might be difficult for jurors with positive attitudes toward police to cast police
officers in the role of aggressor in fatal use of force trials. Jurors trying to reconcile long-held
beliefs that a trusted and respected police officer could be guilty of intentionally hurting a citizen
while serving in the line of duty are likely to experience the discomfort of cognitive dissonance.
Similarly, jurors with negative attitudes toward police might have an equally difficult time
reconciling their belief that police officers are not to be trusted with evidence that the officer
responded reasonably in the face of a serious threat.
In line with the story model, cognitive consistency theories hold that jurors have a
propensity to build stories that are coherent and consistent with their prior beliefs and
knowledge. As such, the way they interpret information and reason about their decisions is
susceptible to judgment biases (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004). Specifically, jurors
engage in a process by which they attend more closely to one perspective of the evidence and
dismiss alternative perspectives (Simon et al., 2004). Engaging in such a process makes difficult
judgments more palatable to jurors and allows them to achieve cognitive consistency while
constructing a coherent story to explain the evidence presented to them at trial.
Thus, jurors’ attitudes toward police are likely to provide the framework for how jurors
attend to and interpret evidence in fatal police use of force cases (Carlson & Russo, 2001).
Particularly, jurors with negative attitudes toward police would be more likely to notice and pay
attention to evidence that supports guilt (i.e., prosecution evidence) and to be more critical and/or
dismissive of evidence that supports the police officer’s need to use deadly force (i.e., defense
evidence). In contrast, jurors with positive attitudes toward police would be more likely to attend
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to evidence that exonerates the officer (i.e., defense evidence) and to discount or disregard any
evidence that suggests guilt (i.e., prosecution evidence).
Jury Instructions in Fatal Use of Force Trials
Jury instructions for criminal trials of police officers are adapted almost exclusively from
civil, rather than criminal, pattern instructions. Specifically, First Circuit criminal pattern
instructions state that police officers should be treated the same as other defendants, and the Fifth
Circuit criminal pattern instructions indicate that police use of force claims should be evaluated
under the Fourth Amendment according to Graham (1989). Otherwise, criminal pattern
instructions do not mention or provide specific guidance on judging police officers who have
been accused of unlawful use of deadly force.
In the 1985 case of Tennessee v. Garner (1985), police officers shot and killed Edward
Garner—who the officers acknowledged did not appear to be armed—with hollow-point bullets
as he tried to escape capture by jumping over a fence. Garner’s family filed a wrongful death
suit, but the district court sided with the officers in saying that Garner assumed the risk of being
shot during his reckless escape attempt. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, however, that decision was reversed on grounds that killing a fleeing suspect is a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. As such, a seizure is only reasonable when the suspect
poses a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld this decision and established new precedent for legally defining the ‘objective
reasonableness standard’ of police officer behavior according to Fourth Amendment standards
for reasonable search and seizure. In the written opinion, the Justices provided a specific list of
factors to consider in determining whether the totality of circumstances justified a particular use
of force (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent persons from officer behavior considered,
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presence/absence of deadly weapon, attempts to temper/limit force, whether warning was given,
etc.). Although the list of relatively objective factors seemed to be a promising start in
establishing guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of deadly
force, the details of this ruling often fade to the background of a well-known case that followed.
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruling in Graham v. Connor cemented the legal requirement
that claims of excessive police use of force should be analyzed according to the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person. Dethorne Graham, who
was diabetic, entered a store to purchase orange juice to counter an insulin reaction. Graham
quickly exited after seeing a long line at the counter. A police officer found Graham’s unusually
quick entrance and exit from the store suspicious and pulled him over. Due to the worsening
insulin reaction, Graham was uncooperative, he exhibited strange behavior, and he was unable to
communicate his condition. Additional officers arrived on the scene and violently subdued
Graham. The officers eventually learned that no crime had taken place at the convenience store
and returned Graham to his home. As a result of the incident, Graham suffered cuts on his wrist,
a bruised forehead, a broken bone in his foot, an injured shoulder, and persistent ringing in his
ears. He subsequently filed suit against the officers for unlawful excessive use of force.
District and appellate courts both denied Graham’s claim based on previous Eighth
Amendment standards requiring a ‘subjective inquiry’ into whether the officers acted with
malicious and sadistic intent. The Supreme Court, however, expanded the precedent set in
Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and unanimously ruled that Graham’s claim—as well as all other
claims of excessive force—are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness” standard. The ruling in Graham v. Connor (1989) validated the precedent set in
the 1985 Connor case and outlined additional factors to consider when evaluating the
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reasonableness of force that stressed the importance of balancing citizens’ right to be free of
unreasonable seizure with police officers’ right to safely perform their duties. Specifically, the
ruling focused legal actor’s attention to the superseding moment, or the very narrow point in time
during which an officer decides to use deadly force (e.g., “…police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving...”). Hence, the justice system was compelled to institute policies and practices that are
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and as such, has slowly—and inconsistently—
incorporated the language provided in Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor
(1989) in the instructions given to jurors in excessive and/or fatal use of force trials.
Once established in Graham v. Connor (1989), the new ‘reasonableness standard’ was
expected to increase the likelihood that police officers would be held accountable for excessive
use of force (MacDonald, 1990). However, it is possible that the language adapted from these
Supreme Court rulings and used to instruct jurors in unlawful use of force trials might have
unintended consequences on how jurors perceive and process information when determining
police officer guilt. Indeed, some legal scholars have argued that Graham-based instructions tend
to be inconsistent and favorable to police, allowing officers to make “exaggerated claims
regarding the dangerousness of police work,” to justify the use of fatal force (Gross, 2016).
Indeed, it is possible that the language in Graham (1989) might lead jurors to engage in
perspective-taking behavior and to give greater consideration to the officer’s subjective
experience in the moment (e.g. “reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene…the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.”). In
contrast, providing jurors with the list of relatively objective factors (e.g., crime is for a felony,
presence/absence of deadly weapon, attempts to temper/limit force, warning was given, etc.)
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from Tennessee v. Garner (1989) might prompt a more deliberate and objective mindset.
My review of published US Appellate Circuit Court jury pattern instructions—available
online from all US Appellate Courts, except the Second and Fourth Circuits—uncovered
substantial inconsistencies in how courts instruct jurors about evaluating fatal police use of force.
Specifically, some instructions incorporated language from Graham (First, Third, and Fifth
Circuit), others incorporated language from Garner (Seventh Circuit), and still yet, others
contained limited (Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit) or detailed (Ninth Circuit) language from
both.
The Effect of Jury Instructions on Jurors’ Decision Making
In an effort to establish professional standards for acceptable jury decision-making
research practices, Lieberman, Krauss, Heen, and Sakiyama (2016) sampled authors of jury
decision-making studies, editorial board members, and journal editors over a 5-year period. The
inclusion of jury instructions was rated as the most important specific trial element required for
acceptable jury-decision making research. This is not surprising, given that the content of jury
instructions is the only direct information jurors are given about the legal standards they are to
apply when evaluating the evidence presented to them at trial.
There are several reasons to expect that superseding moment instructions would lead to
more lenient verdicts than totality of circumstance instructions. First, although jurors with
positive attitudes toward police are already expected to convict at lower rates regardless of
instruction type, superseding moment instructions might exacerbate the influence of attitudes on
verdicts by a.) instructing jurors to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness and b.) by
encouraging jurors to engage in perspective-taking. Specifically, cognitive experiential selftheory (Epstein, 1994) suggests that inducing a subjective standard of reasonableness leads to
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shallow experiential information processing and a greater reliance on existing attitudes and
beliefs. Superseding moment instructions might encourage jurors to adopt such a subjective
standard of reasonableness, which would lead to shallow information processing and might lead
jurors to focus on attitude-congruent evidence (i.e., defense evidence for pro-police jurors and
prosecution evidence for anti-police jurors). Moreover, perspective-taking increases empathy for
defendants (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014) and has also been shown to
decrease stereotyping and ingroup favoritism (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Perhaps superseding
moment instructions would encourage not only jurors with positive attitudes toward police, but
also those with negative attitudes, to have more empathy toward the officer, and to render fewer
convictions.
Second, totality of circumstance instructions might promote an objective reasonableness
standard by providing a list of specific factors for jurors to consider (e.g., crime is for a felony,
risk to innocent persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if
suspect not apprehended, warning given when feasible), which is absent from superseding
moment instructions. Research has shown that jurors who are guided to think objectively and
rationally tend to render more impartial verdicts than jurors who are guided to think subjectively
and experientially (Krauss et al., 2004; Lieberman et al., 2007; Terrance et al., 2006). Hence,
jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions might be less susceptible to the influence of
existing attitudes and make more objective evaluations of the evidence, which would lead to
higher conviction rates when the officer did not act in accordance with the standards outlined in
the instructions.
Third, superseding moment language might also influence verdicts by focusing juror’s
attention on the very narrow point in time when the officer decided to use force (i.e., “…the
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standard of reasonableness at the moment applies… split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving…”). Focusing juror’s attention on this small
moment may lead jurors—particularly those with positive attitudes toward the police—to rely
more heavily on prosecution (versus defense) evidence and to render fewer guilty verdicts. In
contrast, totality of circumstance instructions might guide jurors to take a more global focus by
instructing them to consider all the contextual factors (e.g., “…reasonableness…depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors you may consider…”). Regardless of
their pre-trial attitudes toward police, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions would
render more convictions than jurors who read superseding moment or control instructions.
The moderating effect of jury instructions on juror’s attitudes. Jury instructions
might decrease the biasing influence of attitudes in some situations (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991) and
increase the influence of attitudes in other situations (Meissner, Brigham, & Pfeifer, 2003; PeterHagene and Bottoms, 2017). For example, Pfiefer and Ogloff (1991) demonstrated that, although
participants tend to overwhelmingly rate Black (versus White) defendants as more guilty, the
effect disappears when participants receive instructions to not let prejudice or bias influence their
verdicts. In contrast, jury instructions can also increase the biasing effect of pre-existing
attitudes and beliefs on verdicts (Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017; Peter-Hagene & Ratliff, 2020).
Specifically, jury nullification occurs when—despite clear evidence of guilt—a jury finds a
defendant not guilty because rendering a guilty verdict would violate their own sense of moral
justice. Jury nullification is especially likely in cases with morally ambiguous crimes (e.g.,
euthanasia, marijuana possession) when instructions explicitly allow jurors to follow their own
beliefs rather than the strict rule of law. In such cases, jurors render verdicts that are consistent
with their pre-existing attitudes. For example, Peter-Hagene and Ratliff (2020) had participants
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evaluate a mock euthanasia trial in which a defendant was accused of committing a mercy
killing. Jurors with pro-euthanasia (versus anti-euthanasia) attitudes were overall less likely to
render convictions, but particularly when the instructions informed jurors of their legal right to
follow their own conscience rather than the law. Nullification instructions bolstered the effect of
attitudes on verdicts by encouraging jurors to rely on their feelings of moral outrage toward the
law.
Totality of circumstance instructions adapted from the Garner (1985) ruling are written in
plain language and provide a relatively objective list of factors for jurors to consider when
determining whether the use of lethal force was justified (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to
innocent persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if suspect
not apprehended, warning given when feasible). Thus, perhaps totality of circumstance
instructions would prompt a more careful and rational evaluation of the officer’s behavior. As a
result, totality of circumstance instructions would lead to an increased likelihood that jurors
would be more sensitive to the specific factors that determine the reasonableness of an officer’s
actions. As such, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions would render verdicts
consistent with the evidence, rather than their personal beliefs and attitudes.
The effect of jury instructions on juror’s approach to evaluating evidence. Although
changing jurors’ attitudes about police to ensure impartial verdicts is unlikely, jury instructions
can induce the mindset (i.e., way of thinking about/approaching tasks) with which jurors
approach their task (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2008). For example, seeing a police officer defendant
might prime jurors with the concept of police officers, which would then activate related
concepts such as badge, gun, or crime fighting in memory. Jury instructions, however, induce
certain mindsets in jurors by advising them of the legal guidelines and criteria they are to follow
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in making their determinations.
Research on mindset priming investigates how instructing or encouraging participants to
think in specific ways can affect behavioral outcomes (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer,
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). For example,
Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989) found that people who were primed with a deliberative mindset
(i.e., instructed to make a decision) developed a different way of approaching tasks than people
who were primed with an implemental mindset (i.e., instructed to implement a specific goal).
According to cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), mindsets, or information
processing modes, are either experiential or rational. Experiential reasoning tends to be the
default processing mode because it is efficient and requires less effort by relying on existing
attitudes and beliefs. Rational processing, however, is more analytic and effortful. For example,
Krauss and colleagues (2004) primed participants in a death penalty trial with a mindset to think
experientially (i.e., draw picture of current emotional state) or rationally (complete a math
worksheet) and then exposed participants to expert witness testimony about the dangerousness of
the defendant. Jurors primed with a rational mindset considered fact-based (versus emotional)
testimony and jurors primed with an experiential mindset were more influenced by emotional
(versus fact-based) testimony.
Results from studies into the effects of inducing rational (versus experiential) mindsets in
jurors through the use of jury instructions (e.g., Lieberman et al., 2007) parallel findings from
research investigating the effects of directing jurors to adopt objective versus subjective
standards of reasonableness when determining guilt. For example, in a mock murder trial of a
wife who murdered her abusive husband, Terrance and colleagues (2006) instructed jurors to
adopt either an objective (e.g., “must consider how an ordinary person, operating reasonably
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under the circumstances…would have responded.”) or a subjective (e.g., “not to be judged by
what an average person might consider reasonable…instead by what the defendant honestly
believed…”) standard of reasonableness when determining guilt. Jurors who received objective
(versus subjective) instructions were more likely to convict. Therefore, jurors who are guided to
think objectively and rationally tend to render more impartial verdicts while jurors who are
guided to think subjectively and experientially tend to render verdicts that are more consistent
with pre-existing attitudes and beliefs.
Similarly, superseding moment instructions adapted from the Graham ruling (1989)
encourage jurors evaluating instances of fatal police use of force to consider the officer’s
subjective experience in the moment force was used (e.g., “the standard of reasonableness at the
moment applies…police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments…”). Thus,
superseding moment instructions guide jurors to adopt a subjective standard of reasonableness
and, in turn, might lead to an increased chance that pre-existing attitudes would influence
verdicts. According to cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), this is because inducing
a subjective standard of reasonableness leads to a reliance on existing attitudes and beliefs, with
shallow, experiential information processing. Therefore, jurors with positive attitudes toward
police who read superseding moment instructions might give greater consideration to
prosecution (versus defense) evidence.
In contrast, totality of circumstance instructions outline an objective standard of
reasonableness and provide impartial information to consider when determining officer guilt
(e.g., crime was for a felony, efforts to temper or limit force, warning was given, etc.). Hence,
totality of circumstance instructions might prompt a more rational approach and lead jurors to
render more objective verdicts based on equal consideration of both prosecution and defense
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evidence. Specifically, jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions should be more
willing to render guilty verdicts if an officer’s behavior does not satisfy the objective standard
requirements outlined in the jury instructions.
The effect of jury instructions on perspective-taking. When people engage in
perspective-taking by making a deliberate effort to imagine themselves in another person’s
position, they are more likely to feel empathy with that person (Chambers & Davis, 2012; Davis,
1983). In some cases, perspective-taking has been shown to decrease stereotyping and ingroup
favoritism (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Furthermore, when jury instructions encourage jurors to take
the defendant’s perspective, jurors are more likely to express empathy for, and to ultimately
acquit, the defendant (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014). For example,
Haegerich and Bottoms (2000) found that having mock jurors engage in perspective-taking when
evaluating a 15-year old defendant charged with patricide for killing her sexually abusive father
led to increased empathy for the defendant and fewer guilty verdicts. Similarly, Skorinko and
colleagues (2014) embedded perspective-taking language in jury instructions in a mock vehicular
manslaughter trial. The authors found that perspective-taking led jurors to perceive the defendant
as less culpable, which, in turn, indirectly resulted in seeing the defendant as less guilty. The
language in superseding moment instructions explicitly encourages jurors to engage in
perspective-taking (e.g., “…must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer…forced
to make split-second judgments…”). Thus, jurors who read superseding moment (versus totality
of circumstance or control) instructions would be expected to imagine themselves in the officer’s
position during a fatal use of force incident, which may increase juror empathy for the officer,
and, in turn, lead to higher rates of acquittal.
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Design
In an experimental mock-jury study, the content of jury instructions for first-degree
murder were manipulated to be consistent with either totality of circumstance language
(Tennessee v. Garner, 1985) or superseding moment language (Graham v. Connor, 1989), along
with a control condition that did not contain any police-specific language and instead consisted
of pattern jury instructions for first-degree murder in general. All participants provided informed
consent. Attitudes toward police were measured as a continuous predictor and were
counterbalanced before and after the trial. Participants were asked to provide ratings of
prosecution evidence importance, indicate the extent to which they engaged in perspectivetaking, complete a memory for case facts questionnaire, manipulation checks, and a suspicion
item, as well as provide demographic information. The importance of prosecution evidence and
perspective-taking were measured as potential mediators. The dependent measures were verdicts.
Hypotheses
H1: The content of jury instructions and attitudes toward police would predict guilty
verdicts.
H1.a: I hypothesized a main effect of instructions. Jurors who read totality instructions
were expected to convict at higher rates than jurors who read superseding moment instructions or
control instructions. Jurors who read superseding moment instructions were expected to convict
at lower rates than participants in the control condition. See Figure 1.
H1.b: I hypothesized a main effect of positive attitudes toward police. Jurors with
more positive (versus more negative) attitudes toward police were expected to convict at lower
rates. See Figure 1.
H1.c: I hypothesized an interaction between instruction content and positive
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attitudes toward the police. The predictive power of attitudes for verdicts would vary,
depending on the type of instruction. Because existing beliefs are likely to influence jurors’
perceptions of evidence, attitudes toward police would predict verdicts for jurors who read
control instructions, which contained no specific guidance on evaluating police officer
defendants. Specifically, jurors in the control condition with positive (versus negative) attitudes
toward police would convict more often than jurors who read superseding moment instructions,
but less often than jurors who read totality of circumstance instructions. Moreover, several
factors (i.e., attitude-consistent information, lack of objective instruction, perspective-taking,
narrow focus) suggested that attitudes would predict verdicts for jurors who read superseding
moment instructions. Jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward police who read
superseding moment instructions would be significantly less likely to convict than similar jurors
who read totality of circumstance or control instructions. Finally, because jurors who read
totality instructions are guided to make a more objective evaluation of the evidence, the
predictive power of attitudes was not expected to be significant for them. See Figure 1.
H2: I hypothesized that the importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking
would mediate the relationship between positive attitudes and verdicts, with mediation
being moderated by instruction type. Jurors’ attitudes might influence verdicts by guiding
jurors to attend more closely to pieces of evidence that are consistent (versus inconsistent) with
their pre-existing attitudes (Ellsworth, 1993; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Pennington & Hastie,
1993; Simon et al., 2004), Therefore, jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes toward
police would attribute greater importance to defense evidence while jurors with more negative
(versus positive) attitudes toward police would attribute more importance to prosecution
evidence. In turn, the importance of prosecution evidence would influence verdicts, such that
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jurors who attributed greater importance to prosecution evidence would be expected to convict
the officer most often.
However, this mediation would depend on the moderating effect of instruction type.
Specifically, jurors who read totality of circumstance (versus superseding moment) instructions
would give equal consideration to prosecution and defense evidence, and, in turn, render verdicts
that were consistent with the evidence, rather than their personal beliefs. In contrast, superseding
moment instructions would guide jurors to adopt a subjective (versus objective) standard of
reasonableness and to rely more heavily on their own attitudes and beliefs when rendering their
verdicts. Therefore, the attitudes of jurors who read superseding moment (versus totality of
circumstance) instructions were expected to predict the importance of prosecution evidence, and
ultimately, guilty verdicts. Positive attitudes toward police would predict the importance of
prosecution evidence and guilty verdicts in the control condition to a lesser degree than
superseding moment instructions and to a greater degree than the totality of circumstance
instructions. See Figure 2.
Perspective-taking has been shown to lead to increased empathy (Chambers & Davis,
2012) and ultimately fewer guilty verdicts (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Skorinko, et al., 2014).
Thus, I hypothesized that, for jurors who read superseding moment instructions and were told to
take the perspective of the officer in the moment, jurors with positive (versus negative) attitudes
toward police would be significantly more likely to engage in perspective taking and, in turn, to
acquit the officer. Because jurors who read totality instructions are guided to make a more
objective evaluation of the evidence, the effect of perspective-taking on verdicts would not be
significant. For jurors who read control instructions, jurors with positive (versus negative)
attitudes toward police would be significantly more likely to engage in perspective-taking, and to
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subsequently acquit the officer. See Figure 2.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Participants
I employed a community sample of Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers in order to obtain
a reasonably diverse sample (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Workers received payment
of $2.00 for their participation. A minimum sample of N = 158 was necessary for detecting a
main effect of moderate effect size (f = .25) for the main effect of instruction content on verdicts
with 80% power. To ensure adequate power for testing interaction effects, I recruited more than
four times as many participants (Maxwell, 2004). Participants were N = 645 jury eligible U.S.
citizens recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Due to failed manipulation checks
(N = 34) checks and poor memory for case facts (N = 75), 106 participants were excluded from
analysis. Two items testing memory for case facts (i.e., “Mike Smith, the defendant, testified that
he repeatedly instructed Shawn Davis to “drop the knife and get down on the ground before I
shoot.” ; Nathan Miller, a defense witness, testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking
toward the officers.”) were deemed faulty and excluded from analysis after nearly half of all
participants failed both items.
Of the final sample of N = 539, most participants were women (55%). The majority of
participants were White (79.8%); participants also identified as Black (9.3%), Hispanic (3.9%),
Asian (4.8%), Other (1.3%), and American Indian or Alaska Native (.9%). I conducted
comparative analyses to determine if there were any significant differences between the
participants who were excluded from analyses and those who were retained. An independent
samples t-test revealed significant differences in age between excluded participants and those
retained for the analysis (t(633) = -3.09, p = .002). Participants who failed the memory and
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manipulation checks tended to be younger (M = 38.49, SD = 12.73) than participants who passed
the memory and manipulation checks (M = 43.13, SD = 13.96). Chi-squared analyses revealed
no differences between the excluded participants and those retained for the sample on the
following demographic variables: gender (χ² (N = 635) = 3.58, p = .167), level of education (χ²
(N = 635) = 1.19, p = .881), living environment (χ² (N = 635) = 4.84, p = .089), and recent
interactions with police (χ² (N = 635) = 3.24, p = .072).
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Data collection
took place between March 14, 2020 and March 18, 2020. Because Mechanical Turk samples are
known to be more politically liberal, with 34 - 46% of participants indicating they are democrats
and only 15 - 22% indicating they are republicans (Levay et al., 2016), I oversampled
conservatives to obtain a more politically balanced sample. Specifically, because liberal
Mechanical Turk participants are likely to outnumber conservative participants by an average of
14%, I purposefully recruited 90 participants who identified as political moderates or
conservatives in order to increase the number of conservatives in the full sample by 14%. In the
final sample, 48.8% of participants identified as liberal, 16.4% identified as moderate, and 34.9%
identified as conservative. Participants were relatively well-educated with 13.7% having a
graduate or professional degree, 44% having a bachelor’s degree, 29.3% reporting some college,
11.5% having a high school diploma or GED, and only 0.7% reporting less than a high school
degree. Additionally, most participants (52.3%) reported living in suburban areas, while 25.6%
reporting living in urban areas and another 22.1% reporting living in rural areas. Four
participants did not report their living environment. Because removal of these participants did
not significantly alter any findings, their data was not excluded.
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Materials
Materials and measures are listed here in the order in which they were presented to the
participants.
Consent and eligibility (Appendix A). Participants responded to two yes/no items to
verify their eligibility to participate in the study (i.e., over 18-years old, U.S. citizen) and verified
their informed consent.
Positive attitudes toward police questionnaire (Appendix B). Participants completed a
9-item measure of positive attitudes toward police adapted from Jackson and colleagues (2018).
Although items from the scale have been widely used in similar research on juror’s reactions to
specific incidents of police use of force (e.g., Bradford, et al., 2017; Gerber & Jackson, 2017),
the updated scale was selected for its ability to better characterize various dimensions of personal
beliefs about police officers. Specifically, participants rated their level of disagreement
/agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) with statements regarding bounded
authority (3-items; e.g., “When the police deal with people they almost always behave according
to the law.”), police legitimacy and normative alignment (3-items; e.g., “Police stand up for
values that are important to me.”), and police officers’ neutral decision making (3-items; e.g.,
“Police give people the opportunity to tell their side of the story before making any decisions.”).
The positive attitudes toward police measure was counterbalanced such that half of participants
completed the measure before viewing trial-related materials and the other half completed the
measure after viewing the trial materials, rendering their verdicts, indicating the extent to which
they found the officer guilty, and completed measures of the importance of prosecution evidence
and perspective-taking. Pre- versus post administration of the positive attitudes toward police
measure was used to create the counterbalancing variable (pre-trial = 0, post-trial = 1).
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There was no missing data. The scale was created by averaging item responses and was
found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .93). Responses indicated overall positive
attitudes toward police (M = 3.47, SD = .90) Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the
attitudes toward police measure for the overall sample.
Pre-trial jury instructions (Appendix C). Pre-trial instructions informed all jurors that
the defendant had pleaded not guilty to the charge of first-degree murder and reminded them of
the presumption of innocence and of their duty to render impartial verdicts. Pre-trial instructions
also included the experimental manipulation: totality instructions (adapted from Tennessee v.
Garner,1985), superseding moment instructions (adapted from Graham v. Connor, 1989), or
control instructions with no additional police-specific language.
Participants in the superseding moment condition received pre-trial instructions with the
following additional language:
“The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With
respect to a claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness in the moment
applies. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary, violates the
Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.”

Participants in the totality of circumstance condition received pre-trial instructions with
the following additional language:
“Reasonableness depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors
you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was unreasonable
include, without limitation: The need for the force used; The relationship between the
need for the use of force and the amount of force used; The extent of the victim’s injury;
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force; The severity of
the crime at issue; The threat reasonably perceived by the officer; Whether the victim was
actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if the victim was
attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably
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appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.”
Trial stimulus (Appendix D). The trial summary was adapted from the 2018 trial of
Chicago police officer Jason VanDyke, who was convicted in the shooting death of 17-year old
Laquan McDonald (State of Illinois vs. Jason VanDyke). All names were replaced with fictitious
names. For example, Jason VanDyke was replaced with “Mike Smith” and Laquan McDonald
was replaced with “Shawn Davis.” Participants viewed a presentation of 12 slides, which
consisted of opening and closing statements from the prosecution and defense, evidence, and
witness testimony. On the first slide of the trial presentation, participants read the prosecutor’s
opening statement, in which she argued the officer was guilty of murder because a Taser unit
was in route, other officers on the scene did not feel the need to fire their weapons, and the
victim appeared to be walking away from officers at the time of the shooting, as revealed in
screenshots from a poor quality dashcam video. On the second slide, participants read the
defense attorney’s opening statements, in which he argued the victim had been stealing and
terrorizing people with a knife and that the officer acted according to his training in response to a
reasonable fear for his life, and the life of others.
Next, participants read summaries of trial testimony from four prosecution witnesses,
each presented on separate slides. Prosecution evidence included a map of the area where the
incident started to where it finished, the coroner’s report, and two still photos from a dashcam
video. Images of evidence accompanied the witness testimony to which they were related. For
instance, one prosecution witness testified to having followed the victim for several blocks and
not having felt that his life was in danger; that testimony was accompanied by the map of the
area. Then, participants read trial testimony from four defense witnesses, again with each
presented on separate slides. Defense evidence included photos of a damaged police cruiser, a
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map showing the proximity to nearby restaurants, and a transcript of the 911 audio call. In line
with the presentation of prosecution evidence, defense evidence was presented to participants
within slides containing related witness testimony. Finally, participants viewed one slide
featuring the prosecutor’s closing statement and one slide featuring the defense attorney’s
closing statement.
Post-trial jury instructions (Appendix E). Post-trial instructions were adapted from
Illinois pattern jury instructions but were truncated for ease of clarity for participants. These
instructions advised jurors of their duties, advised against the influence of sympathy or prejudice,
and reminded jurors that the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty. Much like the
pre-trial instructions, post-trial instructions contained the same added manipulation of instruction
type (i.e., totality, superseding moment, control). Additionally, post-trial instructions included
the following definition of first-degree murder:
A person commits the offense of first degree murder when he kills an individual [without
lawful justification] if, in performing the acts which cause the death, [1] he intends to kill
or do great bodily harm to that individual [or another]; [or] [2] he knows that such acts
will cause death to that individual [or another]; [or] [3] he knows that such acts create a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual [or another]; [or] [4]
he [(is attempting to commit) (is committing)] the offense of ____. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should go on with your deliberations to decide
whether a mitigating factor has been proved so that the defendant is guilty of the lesser
offense of second-degree murder instead of first-degree murder.

Dependent Measures
Individual verdicts (Appendix F). Participants provided verdict decisions (guilty/notguilty) and the degree to which they found the defendant guilty (7-point scale: definitely not
guilty to definitely guilty). Although jurors are never asked to provide such ratings of guilt in
actual trial decisions, the measure is valuable in jury decision-making research, as it provides
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information about juror’s level of certainty in their verdict, and also allows for additional
analyses that are not possible with dichotomous verdicts. A majority of jurors rendered guilty
verdicts (N = 223, 58.6%) and overall, jurors were somewhat confident that the officer was guilty
(M = 4.46, SD = 2.07). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the continuous guilt measure for
the overall sample. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix for dependent measures, mediators, and
the moderator.
The Importance of Prosecution Evidence (Appendix G). An initial measure of 10
items, including 5 defense items and 5 prosecution items, tested participant’s evaluations of
evidence importance. The items measuring importance of defense evidence were dropped due to
poor model fit, the final scale was created based on the items that more directly assessed the
conceptual variable of interest: importance assigned to incriminating prosecution evidence. In
order to determine the extent to which participants valued prosecution evidence, participants
rated the importance of 5 elements of prosecution evidence to their verdict decision (i.e.,
“Officer Joseph Collins followed Shawn Davis on foot for blocks and did not feel his life was in
danger.” ; “Every officer knew that a Taser unit was on the way.” ; “Shawn Davis was shot 16
times.” ; “The dashcam photos appeared to show Shawn Davis walking away from the officer.” ;
“According to a law enforcement educator, Officer Mike Smith should have tried to de-escalate
the situation.”). This was a 5-point scale (1 = Extremely important, 5 = Not at all important).
Items were recoded such that higher scores indicated the importance of prosecution evidence and
responses to the scale were averaged. There was no missing data. The scale produced adequate
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) and indicated high ratings of prosecution evidence
importance (M = 3.70, SD = .97). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the importance of
prosecution evidence for the overall sample.
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Perspective-taking (Appendix H). On a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly
disagree), participants rated their level of disagreement/agreement with three items regarding the
extent to which they tried to imagine how the officer felt, what the officer thought, and how
things looked from the officer’s perspective (e.g., “I tried to imagine how I would feel if I were
in the officer’s place.”). The three items were adapted from the 7-item Perspective-taking
subscale of the 28-item Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Items were recoded
such that higher scores indicated higher levels of perspective taking and responses to the scale
were averaged. There was no missing data. The perspective-taking scale was highly reliable in
the current sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .93) and indicated high levels of perspective-taking (M =
5.98, SD = 1.14). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the perspective-taking measure for
the overall sample. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix for dependent measures, mediators, and
the moderator.
Memory for case facts (Appendix I). An 8-item true (e.g. “Shawn Davis popped a tire
on a police cruiser with a knife.”) and false (e.g., “The coroner’s report identified 13 entry
wounds.”) questionnaire measured participant’s recognition of case facts. Participants had to
reach at least 60% accuracy to be included in the study.
Manipulation check (Appendix J). Participants responded to two yes/no items in order
to verify whether the instructions contained a.) superseding moment language (e.g., “…calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving…”) or b.) totality of circumstance language (e.g., …”The need for the force used; The
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; The extent of the
victim’s injury; Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force.
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Participants had to answer this item correctly to be included in the study.
Conceptual manipulation checks (Appendix K). Four conceptual manipulation check
questions assessed whether the manipulations had the intended theoretical effect on participants
(e.g., “The jury instructions encouraged me to rely on my own attitudes and beliefs,” ; “The jury
instructions guided me to focus on the very split-second when the officer used fatal force.”). On
a 5-pont scale, participants rated their level of agreement/disagreement (1 = Strongly agree, 5 =
Strongly disagree). To avoid an acquiescence response bias, lower scores indicated higher
agreement with each of the statements.
Suspicion item (Appendix L). Due to the notoriety of the original case, a suspicion item
allowed for the identification and exclusion of any participants who might have understood the
manipulation or been familiar with the actual case.
Demographics
Demographics (Appendix M). To measure age, participants entered a number
expressing their age in years. To measure gender, participants responded to the following
options: Male, Female, Other. To measure race, participants responded to the following options:
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, African American, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian or
Other Pacific Islander, White, or Other. One item measured political orientation from 1
(extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Living environment was measured by having
participants respond to the following options: Urban, Suburban, or Rural. One yes/no item asked
participants if they had interacted with an on-duty police officer in the last 12 months.
Confirmatory factor analysis. I used Mplus software (Muthen & Muthen, 1998) to
conduct confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to evaluate the overall fit of my model to the data.
The items measuring importance of defense evidence were dropped due to poor model fit, the

34

final scale was created based on the items that more directly assessed the conceptual variable of
interest: importance assigned to incriminating prosecution evidence. The CFA results indicated
that my model adequately fit the data (χ² (72, N = 539) = 498.07, p < .001; root mean square
error approximation (RMSEA) = .048(.043, .054); comparative fit index (CFI) = .961; (nonnormed fit indexes [NNFI]; Tucker–Lewis index [TLI]) = .953; standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR) = .030). All factor loadings on each latent construct (positive attitudes toward
police, the importance of prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking) exceeded the
recommended factor loadings of .400 (e.g., Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Black, 2010). Hence, the
scales employed to measure the constructs were deemed appropriate for use. See Figure 3 for the
fully standardized estimates from the CFA model.
Procedure
After completing consent and eligibility, participants read general instructions informing
them they would play the role of mock jurors, read a presentation of the evidence, and render a
verdict decision. Participants then read standard pre-trial instructions (e.g., charges, jurors’ duty,
etc.), including the experimental manipulation: Some participants were randomly assigned to
read totality of circumstance instructions, others to read superseding moment instructions, and
others to a control condition with no police-specific language. Next, participants viewed a
presentation of the trial summary. After reading the trial summary, participants read post-trial
jury instructions, indicated their verdict decisions (guilty/not-guilty), and indicated the degree to
which they found the defendant guilty (Definitely not guilty-Definitely guilty). After verdicts,
participants rated the importance of prosecution evidence and the degree to which they viewed
the incident from the officer’s perspective.
To avoid order effects, the measure of positive attitudes toward police was
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counterbalanced with the trial stimulus and dependent variables: Half of participants completed
the attitudes measure prior to reading the pre-trial instructions, the other half after providing
verdict decisions and completing the other outcome variables. Participants then completed
attention and manipulation checks. To determine if the instructions had the hypothesized effect,
participants completed four conceptual manipulation check items. Finally, participants reported
their demographics and were debriefed (Appendix N). Average completion time was 24 minutes.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Six participants had missing data: three participants did not answer either manipulation
check item; four participants did not answer the conceptual manipulation check items; four
participants did not provide their age; and five participants did not provide their political
orientation. Participants who did not provide their age or political orientation were included in
each analysis for which they provided data. Given that no significant differences were found
between analyses conducted with and without the four participants who did not answer the
conceptual and manipulation check items, they were not excluded from analysis. Furthermore,
on the suspicion item, one participant reported familiarity with the original case on which the
study was based. However, removal of this participant did not significantly alter any findings and
the datum were not excluded. The cutoff value for significance in all preliminary analyses and
primary hypothesis testing was p < .05.
The effect of instruction content on dependent variables and mediators. Chi-squared
analysis revealed no significant differences in the likelihood of guilty verdicts across
experimental conditions (χ² (N = 539) = 2.35, p = .308). Furthermore, analysis of variance testing
revealed that the experimental effect of instruction content did not significantly influence juror’s
ratings of officer guilt (F = .01, p = .992), the importance of prosecution evidence (F = .56, p =
.570), or perspective-taking (F = .16, p = .849).
The relationship of demographic and control variables with verdicts and case
judgments. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Guilt was measured as a continuous
variable and was averaged, with higher scores indicating higher confidence in guilt. Gender was
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coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women. Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged.
Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the reference group.
Political orientation was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged, with higher scores
indicating more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and
averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was
dummy coded with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent
interactions with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and
averaged with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.
Spearman rank correlation analysis showed age to be negatively associated with the
likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict (r = -.117, p = .007), meaning that younger individuals
were more likely to render guilty verdicts. Race was significantly associated with guilty verdicts:
82.0% of Black jurors convicted the officer, followed by 57.1% of Hispanic jurors, and 55.8% of
White jurors, χ² (N = 539) = 16.39, p = .006. Living environment was also predictive of guilty
verdicts: Jurors who lived in urban areas rendered the highest rates of conviction (68.0%),
followed by jurors who lived in suburban (56.7%) and rural (53.4%) areas, χ² (N = 539) = 8.27, p
= .016. Political orientation was significantly associated with the likelihood of convicting the
officer: the more conservative the juror, the less likely they were to convict, r = -.235, p < .001.
Gender, level of education, and recent interactions with police were not significantly associated
with verdicts (all p’s > .05).
The relationship of demographic and control variables with positive attitudes
toward police. Pearson product moment correlation analyses revealed a significant relationship
between positive attitudes toward police and age (r = .271, p = .001). Specifically, younger
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(versus older) individuals reported more negative attitudes toward police. One-way analysis of
variance revealed a significant relationship between juror race and positive attitudes toward
police (F = 5.61, p < .001). Post-hoc Tukey testing showed that Black jurors (M = 2.89, SD =
.90) had more negative attitudes toward police than White jurors (M = 3.55, SD = .89). One-way
ANOVA testing showed living environment to be predictive of positive attitudes toward police
(F = 4.22, p < .015). Post-hoc Tukey HSD testing revealed that people in urban living
environments (M = 3.33, SD =.89) had more negative attitudes toward police than those living in
rural environments (M = 3.66, SD = .88). No other comparisons were significant. Political
ideology shared a significant relationship with positive attitudes toward police: conservative
jurors endorsed more positive police attitudes than liberal jurors, r = .169, p < .001. Gender,
level of education, and recent interactions with police were not significantly related to the focal
predictor variable (all p’s > .05).
The effect of counterbalancing order of attitudes and trial stimulus. First, I tested
whether the trial stimulus could have influenced jurors’ responses on the attitudes scale. Jurors
who completed the pre-trial attitude measure had more positive attitudes toward police (M =
3.59, SD = .85) than jurors who completed the post-trial attitude measure (M = 3.35, SD = .93),
t(537) = 3.03, p = .002, d = .26. This was unsurprising, given that people report more negative
views of police after learning of police misconduct (e.g., media attention to police misconduct;
Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015).
Possible order effects of positive attitudes toward police on dependent measures of
interest were tested with four independent samples t-tests. Pre-trial versus post-trial
administration of the attitude measure did not result in any significant differences in the
likelihood of guilt (p = .788) or the importance of prosecution evidence (p = .952). However, the
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comparison revealed significant differences in ratings of perspective-taking, t(537) = -2.23, p =
.026, d = .193. Jurors who completed the pre-trial attitude measure reported higher levels of
perspective-taking behavior (M = 2.05, SD = 1.08) than jurors who completed the post-trial
attitude measure (M = 2.27, SD = 1.19). This finding is consistent with prior evidence showing
that perspective-taking influences attitudes (Aberson & Haag, 2007). Pre- and post-trial
administration of the attitude measure was named counterbalancing, coded as 0 (pre-trial) and 1
(post-trial), and was accounted for as a covariate in all subsequent analyses.
Correlations among focal and outcome variables. Participants’ positive attitudes
toward police were negatively associated with the likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict (r = .257, p < .001), meaning that more negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted
guilty verdicts. Additionally, jurors’ negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted
the importance of prosecution evidence (r = -.285, p < .001). Perspective-taking was positively
associated with positive attitudes toward police (r = .306, p < .001), suggesting that jurors with
positive (versus negative) attitudes were more likely to engage in perspective-taking. The
importance of prosecution evidence was predictive of perceived degree of guilt (r = .626, p <
.001), meaning that the importance of prosecution (versus defense) evidence was associated with
higher guilt ratings. Perspective-taking was also predictive of perceived degree of guilt (r = .168, p = .001), with higher levels of perspective-taking predicting less perceived guilt. See
Table 3 for all coefficients.
Conceptual manipulation check. Four One-way ANOVAs tested whether the
superseding moment or totality of circumstance jury instructions had the theorized effect on
jurors across each condition (i.e., that superseding moment instructions would lead jurors to rely
on their own attitudes and to focus on the split-second in which the shooting occurred, while
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totality of circumstance instructions would lead jurors to rely on objective standards and to focus
on all facts and circumstances before and after the shooting). The effect of experimental
condition on jurors’ perceptions that the jury instructions encouraged them to rely on their own
attitudes was significant, F(2, 532) = 3.35, p = .036, 𝜂2 = .01. Post-hoc Tukey HSD testing
revealed that jurors in the totality of circumstance condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.30) felt less
encouraged to rely on their own attitudes compared to jurors in the control condition (M = 3.40,
SD = 1.47, d = .26), but jurors in the superseding moment condition (M = 3.68, SD = 1.38) did
not differ from either the control (d = .20) or totality of circumstance (d = .06) conditions.
The effect of instruction content was also significant on jurors’ perceptions that the jury
instructions encouraged them to rely on objective standards, F(2,532) = 4.19, p = .016, , 𝜂2 =
.02. Post-hoc testing revealed that jurors in the totality of circumstance condition (M = 1.58, SD
= .77) reported that the instructions encouraged them to rely on objective standards more often
than participants in the control (M = 1.86, SD = 1.10, d = .29), or superseding moment (M = 1.84,
SD = 1.10, d = .27) conditions. Participants in the superseding moment and control conditions
did not differ from each other (d = .02).
Next, instruction content significantly influenced jurors’ reports of whether the
instructions encouraged them to focus on the split second before the officer used fatal force F(2,
532) = 39.93, p < .001, , 𝜂2 = .13). Post-hoc testing showed that participants in the superseding
moment condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.24) were more likely to report that the instructions
encouraged them to focus on the split-second the officer used force than were participants in the
control (M = 3.35, SD = 1.41, d = .79) or totality of circumstance (M = 3.38, SD 1.18, d = .81)
conditions, neither of which differed from each other (d = .02).
Finally, the effect of experimental condition also significantly influenced jurors’ reports
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of whether the jury instructions guided them to focus on all facts and circumstances before and
after the shooting, F(2, 532) = 9.45, p < .001 , 𝜂2 = .04. According to post-hoc testing, jurors in
the superseding moment condition (M = 2.08, SD = 1.14) were less likely to report that the
instructions guided them to focus on all of the facts and circumstances than were participants in
the control (M = 1.78, SD = .99, d = .28) or totality of circumstance (M = 1.62, SD = .84, d = .46)
conditions, which did not differ from each other (d = .17).
Primary Hypothesis Testing
The main effects of attitudes and instructions on dichotomous verdicts. Hierarchical
logistic regression analyses tested whether the content of jury instructions and positive attitudes
toward police explained a significant amount of variance in juror’s perceptions of officer guilt
after controlling for age, gender, race, education, political ideology, living environment, recent
interactions with police officers, and counterbalancing (H1; Figure 1). The current study met the
major assumption of logistic regression: the dependent variable (verdict) was dichotomous, there
was no multicollinearity among the independent variables, there were no outliers, and there was
not a linear relationship between the odds ratio and the independent variable.
The continuous moderator (positive attitudes toward police) was centered at the mean.
Instruction content was dummy coded with the control group serving as the initial reference
group. Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the initial reference
group. Living environment was dummy coded with participants from suburban environments
serving as the initial reference group. After demographic variables and counterbalancing were
entered as controls at Step 1, Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of
positive attitudes toward police and jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment and totality of
circumstance) on the likelihood of conviction. The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e.,
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superseding moment X attitudes and totality of circumstance X attitudes) in order to determine
whether the relationship between positive attitudes toward police and guilty verdicts was
moderated by the content of jury instructions. See Table 3 for all coefficients.
The Step 1 model was significant, χ2(9) = 47.66, p < .00, Nagelkerke R² = .12.
Specifically, there was a main effect of race (B = 1.02, Wald, 6.66, OR = 2.78, p = .010) such
that Black participants were more likely to convict the officer than White participants. There
were no differences in guilty verdicts between White and Hispanic participants. There was also a
main effect of political orientation (B = -.27, Wald = 22.81, OR = .78, p < .001). The more liberal
the juror, the more likely they were to convict the officer. Counterbalancing and other control
variables had no significant effect. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of positive
attitudes toward police at Step 2, B = -0.43, Wald = 12.08, OR = 0.65, p = .001, such that
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted guilty verdicts. The main effects of
superseding moment and totality of circumstance compared to control instructions were not
significant at Step 2 (p > .05). Adding the interaction terms at Step 3 did not increase the amount
of variance explained (p > .05). See Table 3 for all coefficients. See Figure 3 for a line graph.
A similar logistic regression analysis compared the totality of circumstance condition
with the superseding moment condition by using the superseding moment group as the reference
group. After demographic variables and counterbalancing were entered as controls at Step 1,
Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive attitudes toward police
and jury instructions (i.e., control and totality of circumstance) on the likelihood of conviction.
The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., control X attitudes and totality of circumstance
X attitudes). The main effect of totality of circumstance versus superseding moment instructions
was not significant at Step 2, B = .42 Wald = 3.13, OR = 1.53, p = .077. See Table 4 for all
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coefficients.
The main effects of attitudes and instructions on continuous guilt ratings.
Hierarchical linear regression analyses tested whether the content of jury instructions explained a
significant amount of variance in juror’s ratings of officer guilt. All assumptions for analysis
were met. First, the assumption of no multicollinearity was met, as no VIF values were greater
than 5.0 and no Tolerance values were below 0.10. Next, the assumption of no autocorrelation of
residuals was met, as Durbin-Watson results fell within the expected range. Finally, the
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were also met, as the scatterplot of standardized
residuals on standardized predicted values did not funnel out or curve. Positive attitudes toward
police were mean centered. Counterbalancing and all demographic variables were entered as
controls at Step 1. Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive
attitudes toward police and jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment and totality of
circumstance) on continuous guilt ratings. The interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e.,
superseding moment X attitudes and totality of circumstance X attitudes) in order to determine
whether the relationship between positive attitudes toward police and guilt ratings was
moderated by the content of jury instructions.
The Step 1 model was significant, F(4, 429) = 5.97, p < .00, R² = .10, indicating that
demographic variables accounted for significant amounts of variance in ratings of guilt.
Specifically, there was a main effect of participant race, B = 1.03, p = .001, 95% CI = [.43, 1.63],
such that Black participants were more likely than White participants to find the officer guilty.
There was also a main effect of political orientation, B = -.28, p < .001, 95% CI = -.38, -.18]. The
more liberal the juror, the more certain they were of the officer’s guilt. Adding the predictor and
moderator at Step 2 accounted for additional variance in guilt ratings, F = 8.84, p < .001, Δ R² =
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.07. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of positive attitudes toward police at Step 2,
B = -.67, p <. .001, 95% CI = [-.88, -.48], such that such that positive (versus negative) attitudes
toward police predicted lower confidence in guilty verdicts. The effect of instruction content was
not significant: superseding moment, B = .02, p = .905, 95% CI = [-.38, .42], and totality of
circumstance, B = .03, p = .874, 95% CI = [-.37, .43], instructions were not significantly
different from the control condition. Adding the interaction terms did not improve the model. See
Table 3 for all coefficients. See Table 5 for all coefficients.
A similar linear regression analysis compared the totality of circumstance condition with
the superseding moment condition by using the superseding moment group as the reference
group. After counterbalancing and demographic variables were entered as controls at Step 1,
Step 2 of the hierarchical regression tested the main effects of positive attitudes toward police
and jury instructions (i.e., control and totality of circumstance) on continuous guilt ratings. The
interaction terms were added at Step 3 (i.e., control X attitudes and totality of circumstance X
attitudes). The main effect of totality of circumstance versus superseding moment instructions
was not significant at Step 2, B = .01, p = .970, 95% CI = [-.40, .42], and there were no
significant interactions (all p’s < .05). See Table 6 for all coefficients.
Moderated Mediation Analyses
Version 3.4 of Hayes’s Process Macro (Hayes, 2017) tested whether the effect of
attitudes on dichotomous verdicts was mediated the importance of prosecution evidence or
perspective-taking behavior—and whether those relationships were moderated by instruction
type. The model relies on OLS regression in estimating coefficients in log-odds metric but
allows for dichotomous outcomes. Model 8 tested the moderated mediation hypotheses that the
importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking mediated the relationship between
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positive attitudes toward police and verdicts, with a-paths being moderated by instruction type
(H2; Figure 2.). Specifically, I tested if there was a direct effect of positive attitudes toward
police (X) on perceived degree of guilt (Y), and whether there was an indirect effect of positive
attitudes toward police on perceived degree of guilt through the importance of prosecution
evidence (M1) and perspective-taking (M2). Hayes PROCESS macro Model 8 accommodates
multiple mediators acting in parallel, as well as multi-categorical moderator variables. Positive
attitudes toward police, the importance of prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were
mean-centered. Counterbalancing and demographic variables were controlled as covariates and
predicted attitudes toward police, importance of prosecution evidence, perspective-taking, and
guilty verdicts. The number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap intervals was 5000.
The dummy variables for totality of circumstance and superseding moment instructions were
included in the model, with the control instructions serving as the initial reference group. The
same process was then repeated with the superseding instructions serving as the reference group.
Positive attitudes toward police significantly predicted the importance of prosecution
evidence, B = -.27, p = .005, 95% CI = [-.46, -.09]. Specifically, jurors with more positive
(versus more negative) attitudes toward police tended to attribute less importance to prosecution
evidence. As predicted, positive attitudes toward police also significantly predicted perspectivetaking, B = .42, p = .001, 95% CI = [.20, .65]. Jurors with more positive (versus negative)
attitudes toward the police reported higher levels of perspective-taking. In turn, attributions of
importance to prosecution evidence significantly predicted verdict outcomes, B= 1.96, p < .001,
95% CI = [ 1.55, 2.38]. Jurors who attributed more importance to prosecution evidence were
more likely to render guilty verdicts. Perspective-taking was also a significant predictor of
verdicts, B = -.39, p = .008, 95% CI = [-.69, -.10] indicating that jurors who reported higher
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levels of perspective-taking were less likely to convict the officer. Instruction content did not
significantly moderate the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence or on
perspective-taking and there were no significant interactions. The conditional indirect effect of
attitudes on verdicts through the importance of prosecution evidence was significant in the
control (95% CI = [-.97, -.18]) and totality (95% CI = [-.92, -.10]) conditions, but was not
significant in the superseding moment (95% CI = [-.66, .05]) condition. The index of moderated
mediation was not significant, 95% CI = [-.23, .76]. The conditional indirect effect through
perspective-taking was significant in the control (95% CI = [-.50, -.01]) and superseding moment
(95% CI = [-.38, -.00]) conditions, but was not significant in the totality of circumstance (95%
CI = [-.08, .01]) condition. The index of moderated mediation was not significant, 95% CI – [.25, .03]).
Participants with higher levels of education attributed less importance to prosecution
evidence, B = -.13, p = .013, 95% CI [-.22, -.04], and engaged in less perspective-taking, B =
.13, p = .021, 95% CI = [.02, .23]. More conservative (versus more liberal) jurors attributed more
importance to prosecution evidence B = -.07, p = .003, 95% CI = [-.12, -.03]. No other control
variables were significantly related to focal variables.
Thus, the results indicated that the relationship between jurors’ positive attitudes toward
police and their verdict choices was mediated through the importance of prosecution evidence,
and through perspective-taking, but was not influenced by jury instruction content. When
compared to the control condition, neither superseding moment nor totality of circumstance
instructions significantly moderated the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution
evidence or perspective-taking. Figure 4 is a path diagram depicting the results of the moderated
mediation model (Hayes, 2012) with the control group serving as the reference.
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To test any significant differences between the superseding moment and totality of
circumstance conditions, the same analysis was repeated with the superseding moment condition
serving as the reference group. The pattern of results was similar to that seen in the first model.
Positive attitudes toward police predicted the importance of prosecution evidence (B = -.19, p =
.024, 95% CI = [-.33, -.02]) and perspective-taking (B = .33, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.51, -.16]). In
turn, the importance of prosecution evidence (B = 1.96, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.55, 2.38]) and
perspective-taking (B = .-.39, p = .008, 95% CI [-.69, -.10] both predicted verdict outcomes.
Instruction content did not significantly moderate the effect of attitudes on the importance of
prosecution evidence or on perspective-taking and there were no significant interactions. The
conditional indirect effect of attitudes through the importance of prosecution evidence was
significant across the control (95% CI = [-.99, -.16]), superseding moment (95% CI = [-.66, .04]), and totality of circumstance (95% CI = [-.92, -.11]) conditions. The index of moderated
mediation was not significant when comparing the superseding moment to the totality of
circumstance (95% CI = [-.69, .29]) or control (95% CI = [-.77, .26] conditions. Figure 5 is a
path diagram depicting the results of the moderated mediation model (Hayes, 2012) with the
superseding moment group serving as the reference. Overall, moderated mediation analysis
showed that the relationship between jurors’ positive attitudes toward police and their verdicts
was mediated through the importance of prosecution evidence and through perspective-taking,
but was not influenced directly, or indirectly, by jury instruction content.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
As expected, juror’s attitudes toward the police were predictive of their verdicts. Jurors
with negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police were more likely to convict the officer.
Across three experimental conditions in a mock fatal police use of force trial, I manipulated the
content of jury instructions to be consistent with totality of circumstance language (Tennessee v.
Garner, 1985), superseding moment language (Graham v. Connor, 1989), or a control condition
with no police-specific language. Testing the mediating effects of the importance of prosecution
evidence and the extent to which they engaged in perspective-taking further contextualized the
effects of jurors existing attitudes toward police on their verdict decisions. Specifically, jurors’
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted the importance of prosecution
evidence and, in turn, the importance of prosecution evidence influenced verdict outcomes.
Additionally, positive attitudes toward police predicted perspective-taking and perspectivetaking predicted verdict outcomes. Jurors who reported higher levels of perspective-taking were
less likely to convict the officer. The content of jury instructions did not successfully moderate
the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence or perspective-taking. In other
words, the relationship between jurors’ attitudes toward police and their verdicts was mediated
through the importance of prosecution evidence and through perspective-taking, but was not
influenced by jury instruction content.
The Relationship between Attitudes and Verdicts
The present study provided further evidence in support of the powerful effect jurors’
attitudes on their legal judgments. Similarly, Carlson and Russo (2001) demonstrated that jurors’
pre-trial attitudes toward typical civil defendants predicted verdict preferences. My findings were
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more specifically in line with evidence from studies investigating the effect of juror’s attitudes
on their judgments of specific use of force incidents (e.g., Celestin & Kruschke, 2018; Gerber &
Jackson, 2017; Jefferis, Butcher, & Hanley, 2011; Weitzer, 2002). As expected, jurors with
positive attitudes toward police were more likely to acquit the police officer of illegal use of fatal
force and those with negative attitudes toward police were more likely to convict the officer.
According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), attitudes tend to develop in favor of, or against,
persons, places, or things, and once formed, they allow individuals to make rapid judgments in
social situations without expending much cognitive effort. As such, the attitude that a person has
developed toward police over the course of their life—through their own experiences and
learning about the experiences of others—come to influence how that person would perceive and
process information presented to them in a fatal police use of force trial.
Consistent with public polling data (e.g., Pew Research Center; Fingerhut, 2017), jurors
in the present study reported generally positive attitudes toward police. However, there were
several indications that overall attitudes toward police have continued to shift downward among
some groups of individuals. For example, finding that non-White participants were more likely
to have somewhat negative attitudes toward the police, and to render more convictions, was not
surprising in light of the poor relationship between police and communities of color (Wheelock,
Stroshine, & O’Hear, 2018). Black Americans make up 13% of the total population, yet they
account for 27% of the total victims of police shootings, and 38% of the unarmed civilians killed
by police each year (U.S. Census Data, July 2017; Washington Post, 2018). Consequently, Black
Americans report feeling targeted and abused by law enforcement (Weitzer, Tuch, & Skogan,
2008) and do not believe police officers are held accountable for faulty judgment in use of force
cases. Furthermore, verdicts in the present study were consistent with other studies showing that
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younger (Jefferis, et al., 1997; McLean, Wolfe, & Pratt, 2019), non-White (Weitzer, et al., 2008),
and/or liberal (Gerber & Jackson, 2017) jurors, and those who live in urban areas (Ekins, 2016),
are the least likely to have positive attitudes toward police. These findings are consistent with
research investigating how strongly held public or peer attitudes about police shootings can lead
to stronger individual attitudes (i.e., the “bandwagon effect,” Huff, Alvarez, & Miller, 2018).
Jurors in the present study who completed the pre-trial (versus post-trial) attitude measure
reported more positive attitudes toward police, which is consistent with evidence showing that
exposure to negative information about social groups leads to more negative attitudes toward
those groups (e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015),. Specifically, media
coverage of police shootings has increased over time (McLaughlin, 2015) and, in line with
present findings, people report more negative views of police following recent exposure to news
coverage of police misconduct (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Weitzer, 2002; Kochel, 2015). For
example, Kochel (2015) demonstrated that negative views of police increased with exposure to
the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO but, perhaps due to increased fear,
willingness to cooperate with police also increased overall.
Although pre-trial versus post-trial administration of the attitude measure did not result in
any significant differences in the likelihood of rendering a guilty verdict or the importance of
prosecution evidence, the timing of the attitude measure did influence the extent to which
participants attempted to view the incident from the officer’s perspective. In line with prior
evidence showing that perspective-taking influences attitudes (Aberson & Haag, 2007), jurors in
the present study who completed the pre-trial attitude measure reported higher levels of
perspective-taking behavior than participants who completed the post-trial attitude measure.
Superseding moment instructions encouraged jurors to consider the officer’s subjective
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experience in the moment force was used (e.g., “the standard of reasonableness at the moment
applies…police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments…”). According to
cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994), inducing such a subjective standard of
reasonableness should have led jurors in the superseding moment condition to more heavily
consider defense (versus prosecution) evidence and, in turn, to acquit the officer. However, this
hypothesis was not supported by the evidence. Although juror’s perceptions of officer guilt were
technically trending in the predicted direction, the effect of attitudes toward police on guilty
verdicts in the superseding moment condition was essentially indistinguishable from the control
condition.
The Effect of Instruction Content on Verdicts
My hypothesis that juror’s verdicts would be influenced by the content of jury
instructions was not supported by the findings. Thus, the findings are inconsistent with prior
evidence that guiding or instructing participants to think in specific ways can affect behavioral
outcomes (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Bargh et al.,
2001; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). Specifically, when the totality of circumstance instructions
guided jurors to consider a list of specific factors (e.g., crime is for a felony, risk to innocent
persons from officer behavior, substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if suspect not
apprehended, warning given when feasible), jurors were expected to be more likely to convict
the officer than jurors in the superseding moment or control conditions, but that was not the case.
Information processing. Although evidence has shown that jurors take jury instructions
seriously and work hard to understand them, they often fall short (Ellsworth, 1989). Jurors
frequently misunderstand the instructions given to them and fail to grasp how the instructions
relate to fundamental principles in the justice system (Ellsworth, 2003; Saxton, 1989). Indeed,
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evidence has shown that jurors understand less than half of the instructions they receive
(Reifman, et al., 1992). Serious consequences can follow when jurors fail to comprehend the
legal instructions they are given. For example, evidence has shown that jurors who experienced
substantial confusion over jury instructions were more willing to impose the death penalty than
jurors who had a better understanding of the instructions (Weiner, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995).
However, when jurors are reminded of the importance of careful analysis, they will put forth the
effort (Bornstein & Greene, 2011). Although jurors in the present study seemed to grasp the
content of the instructions, their understanding of the content did not significantly influence their
decision-making.
In the present study, jurors demonstrated sensitivity to the content of the jury instructions
by correctly identifying the guidance they had received. Specifically, jurors in the totality of
circumstance condition reported feeling less encouraged to rely on their own attitudes than did
participants in the control and superseding moment conditions. Furthermore, jurors in the totality
of circumstance condition reported that the instructions encouraged them to rely on objective
standards more often than participants in the control or superseding moment conditions.
However, totality of circumstance instructions did not significantly influence verdicts directly
and did not influence the relationship between attitudes and verdict decisions.
Participants in the superseding moment condition were more likely than participants in
the control or totality of circumstance conditions to report that the instructions encouraged them
to focus on the split-second the officer used force. Additionally, jurors in the superseding
moment condition were less likely to report that the instructions guided them to focus on all the
facts and circumstances than were participants in the control or totality of circumstance
conditions. Despite juror’s sensitivity to the content of superseding moment instructions, jurors’
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grasp of the overall guidance they received from the instructions did not directly or indirectly
influence their verdict decisions.
The Mediating Effect of the Importance of Prosecution Evidence
Jurors’ attitudes toward police influenced their perceptions of the evidence presented to
them during a mock criminal trial of a police officer defendant charged with first-degree murder
for unlawful use of fatal force. Hence, my findings provided further support for the tenets of
cognitive consistency theory (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004) and extend prior
research demonstrating that people’s decision-making is distorted by their existing knowledge
and beliefs (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004; Russo, Carlson, Meloy,
2008). Specifically, attitudes toward police officers had a substantial influence on the way jurors
perceived and interpreted the importance of evidence presented to them during a trial of a police
officer. Consistent with theoretical expectations, jurors in the present study with more negative
(versus positive) attitudes toward police tended to place higher value on prosecution evidence. In
turn, placing greater importance on prosecution evidence was associated with a higher likelihood
of rendering a guilty verdict. According to theory, this is because a person’s social attitude
influences how they process new information related to that attitude, and prepares them to
perceive events that are consistent with their beliefs (Roskos-Ewoldwon & Fazio, 1992; Fazio, et
al., 1994).
The Mediating Effect of Perspective-Taking
As predicted, the effect of jurors’ positive attitudes toward police on their verdicts was
mediated through perspective-taking behavior. Prior evidence has shown that perspective-taking
increases empathy for defendants and decreases conviction rates (Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000;
Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014). Because superseding moment
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instructions explicitly encouraged jurors to engage in perspective-taking (e.g., “…must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer…forced to make split-second judgments…”), jurors
in the superseding moment (versus control or totality) condition were expected to feel increased
empathy for the officer and, in turn, to acquit the officer at higher rates. However, this was not
the observed pattern of results.
The superseding moment instructions had no significant effect on the extent to which
jurors engaged in perspective-taking. Although juror’s attitudes toward police influenced the
extent to which jurors reported engaging in perspective-taking, the effect was in the opposite
direction of that predicted. Specifically, people with negative (versus positive) attitudes toward
police were less likely to engage in perspective-taking, and, in turn, more likely to convict the
officer. Thus, the present findings contribute to the study of perspective-taking behavior by
demonstrating that individual’s relevant attitudes influence the extent to which they engage in
perspective-taking behavior, which, in turn, comes to influence decision-making processes.
The Overall Moderated Mediation Model
As anticipated, results of the overall model revealed that jurors’ positive attitudes toward
police predicted the importance of prosecution evidence and perspective-taking behavior, in turn,
these mediators predicted verdict outcomes. Specifically, negative attitudes toward police
predicted the importance of prosecution evidence and, in turn, the importance of prosecution
evidence predicted guilty verdicts. Similarly, negative attitudes toward police predicted low
levels of perspective-taking and, in turn, higher convict rates. In contrast to my prediction, there
were no direct effects of instruction content, instruction content did not significantly moderate
the effect of attitudes on the importance of prosecution evidence, or on perspective-taking, and
there were no significant interactions.
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Psychological Implications
Results from the present study have important implications for the psychological study of
jury decision-making. Importantly, my findings suggested that jurors’ attitudes toward police are
likely to influence verdicts in fatal police use of force trials. In support of the story model of jury
decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and cognitive consistency theory (Holyoak &
Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004), jurors’ verdicts in this mock trial appear to have been shaped
by their desire to make decisions that were consistent with their attitudes toward police.
Research applying cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994) to the study of jury
decision-making has demonstrated that inducing experiential or rational information processing
can be accomplished in a multitude of ways across various legal contexts. Thus, the present
study contributed to the literature on cognitive experiential self-theory by testing whether jury
instructions in fatal use of force trials moderated the effect of existing attitudes toward police on
verdict decisions. Contrary to expectations, instruction content did not moderate the effect of
attitudes on verdicts. Hence, the jury instructions used in fatal police use of force cases do not
appear to have been effective stimuli for inducing a rational versus experiential mode of
information processing.
Practical Implications
When people perceive police procedures and courtroom adjudications as fair, they have
increased trust in the justice system (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2007). Yet public
outrage has grown in response to a perceived lack of accountability for police officers who
employ fatal use of force (Grinberg, 2018; McLaughlin, 2015; Stinson, 2019). Indeed, as I am in
the final editing stages of this manuscript, protests and marches against police brutality toward
Black Americans have erupted all over the world, sparked by the death of George Floyd in
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Minneapolis, Minnesota. Considering increased public scrutiny of fatal police shooting incidents,
the number of such trials is likely to increase. The present findings have important implications
for the criminal justice system as a whole—and specifically for legal actors in fatal police use of
force cases—as jurors’ attitudes toward police are likely to shape how jurors view the evidence
presented to them during fatal police use of force trials. Continuing to address procedural
variations and potential shortcomings in the legal system ensures that justice is distributed evenly
and without bias. In turn, this sends a message to the community that the legal process is
representative of the community as a whole and that authorities within the legal system are
willing to recognize and correct failures when there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Strengths and Limitations
The present study took an important first step towards understanding how the specific
types of jury instructions that are given in fatal police use of force trials may come to influence
the effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police on their ultimate verdict decisions. Statistical
conclusion validity was increased by ensuring an adequate sample size (Maxwell, 2004).
Ecological validity was increased through the use of study materials that were adapted from
actual trial materials, as well as jury instructions (i.e., superseding moment, totality of
circumstance, or control), which are used in actual fatal police use of force trials. In practice,
however, jury instructions sometimes contain a combination of superseding moment language
and totality of circumstance language or may not contain language from either. However, to test
other practical effects of interest within a single design, the present study compared only jury
instructions containing superseding moment instructions with those containing totality of
circumstance language or control instructions with no police-specific language. Furthermore,
although the charges presented to jurors were directly quoted from Illinois criminal pattern
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instructions, they are not fully representative of the inevitable variations found in actual charging
instructions across different jurisdictions, states, and Circuits in the United States.
Despite the contributions of this study to advancing understanding of jury decision
making in fatal police use of force trials, there were several notable limitations. First, a
community sample of mock-jurors that deliberated in groups would have provided several
advantages over the online sample of individual participants in the present study. Although many
studies have demonstrated that individual, pre-deliberation verdicts are reliable predictors of
final group verdicts (Kalven & Zeisel, 1972; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995), several studies have
shown that deliberation has a powerful impact on trial outcomes. For example, studies have
shown deliberation leads to discussion of more case facts (Ellsworth, 1989), fewer guilty verdicts
(i.e., leniency bias; Kerr & MacCoun, 2012), and can reduce the effect of attitudes on verdicts in
morally ambiguous cases (i.e., euthanasia; Meissner et al., 2003). Furthermore, deliberating vs
non-deliberating jurors are less likely to be influenced by pre-trial publicity (Ruva & McEvoy,
2008; Ruva & Guenther, 2015) and are better able to disregard inadmissible evidence (Kerwin &
Shaffer, 1994). Moreover, deliberation increases jurors’ understanding of, and compliance with,
jury instructions (Ellsworth, 1989). For instance, Devine et al., (2001) found that deliberating
(versus non-deliberating) jurors demonstrated 17% stronger comprehension of standard
instructions and 38% stronger comprehension of simplified instructions.
A representative community sample would also have been more ecologically valid than
the online sample of participants employed in the present study. Although some evidence has
suggested that MTurk participants are no more likely to engage in problematic behaviors (e.g.,
complete the same study multiple times, provide misleading information) than participants from
campus or community samples (Necka, Cacioppo, Norman, & Cacioppo, 2016), other evidence
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suggests otherwise (Wessling, Huber, & Netzer, 2017). For example, Wessler and colleagues
found that a substantial proportion of MTurk workers misrepresented their character and identity
to qualify for a study. Furthermore, given that MTurk workers are unsupervised and financially
motivated to complete the study as quickly as possible, evidence suggests they may put forth
insufficient effort (see Ford for a review, 2017).
Additionally, requiring participants to deliberate with other jurors would have
strengthened the situational pressure to disregard any personal preferences and render verdicts
that were more consistent with the evidence and legal guidelines. According to situational
strength literature, deliberating jurors face more situational pressure to ignore the influence of
their own individual differences, which reduces the strength of the relationship between
individual personality differences and actual behavior (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Hence, additional
steps could have been taken to increase the situational strength when jurors rendered their
verdicts. Specifically, the experimental design could have incorporated a virtual group
deliberation via anonymous chatrooms. Indeed, mock-jury studies in which groups of jurors
anonymously attended secure chat rooms and shared written responses with each other until they
reached a decision have produced similar benefits to actual jury deliberations (Tabak, Klettke, &
Knight, 2013). In support, Kuhn, Weinstock, and Flaton (1994) compared jurors who a.)
answered reasoning questions after the trial, b.) answered reasoning questions after deliberating
with others, or c.) answered reasoning questions after ruminating about the details of the trial,
and found that jurors in the deliberation group demonstrated higher reasoning skills than
participants in the other groups. Thus, it is possible that the use of individual verdict decisions
underestimated participant’s reasoning skills.
Furthermore, six participants failed to complete all the demographic and control
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measures. Specifically, four of those participants did not provide their age and five did not
provide their political orientation. This highlights a limitation in the present study, as age and
political orientation were strongly associated with attitudes toward police and verdicts. Younger
(versus older) and more liberal (versus more conservative) jurors reported more negative
attitudes toward police and rendered guilty verdicts more often. Although the absence of data
from these participants did not substantially alter any of the present findings, it is unknown what
type of impact the presence of that information may have had. Lastly, other theoretical
explanations and measures may offer better insights and predictions than those currently
employed.
Future Directions
The next step would be to replicate the present study with a community sample of mockjurors who deliberated in groups. Current evidence of juror’s reactions to specific police use of
force incidents remains somewhat sparse in the literature, but notable studies have examined the
effects of political ideology (Gerber & Jackson, 2017), victim race (Huff, et al., 2018),
eyewitness race (Saulnier, Burke, & Bottoms, 2019), justifiability of force (Huff, et al., 2018),
severity of the victim’s action relative to the officer’s reaction (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019), and
the effects of body-worn camera footage (Saulnier & Burke, 2019) on juror’s judgments.
Investigating whether jury instructions might strengthen or diminish the effect of attitudes on
juror’s judgments across such topics would serve the development of jury decision-making
theories and would also increase ecological validity.
Finally, it is possible that verdict outcomes would have been different if jurors had been
given additional, or different, charging options from first-degree murder. My findings were
inconsistent with prior evidence that providing jurors with only “severe” punishment options
lowered convictions (Kerr, 1978). Evidence has also shown that when “moderate” penalty
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options are available, convictions increase (Vidmar, 1972), with the inclusion of manslaughter
decreasing both guilty and not-guilty verdicts (Smithson, Deady, & Gracik, 2007). Further
research is needed to address and resolve theoretical discrepancies related to the effects of
charging severity.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The present findings increased our understanding of the influence of jurors’ attitudes on
their decision-making process during fatal police use of force trials. Specifically, jurors’ attitudes
toward police shaped their evaluations of the prosecution evidence and the extent to which they
engaged in perspective-taking behavior during a fatal police use of force trial. Jurors’ with
negative (versus positive) attitudes toward police attributed greater importance to prosecution
evidence, which, in turn, lead jurors to convict the officer more often. Additionally, negative
(versus positive) attitudes toward police predicted low levels of perspective-taking, and, in turn,
low levels of perspective-taking predicted higher rates of conviction. Finally, the content of jury
instructions was not a successful moderator of the relationship between attitudes and verdicts.
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EXHIBITS

The Effect of Instruction Content and Attitudes
Toward Police on Guilty Verdicts

% Guilty Verdict

100

80
60

Totality
Superseding

40

Control
20
0
Positive Attitudes
Negative Attitudes
Police Legitimacy Attitudes

Figure 1. Line graph depicting the predicted interaction effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police,
and the content of jury instructions, on guilty verdicts in a fatal police use of force trial.
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Figure 2. Path diagram for the predicted moderated mediation model (Hayes, 2012).
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Prosecution
Importance

Figure 3. Fully Standardized CFA Estimates. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; RMSEA =
root mean square error approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit
index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual.
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The Effect of Attitudes Toward Police and Instruction Content
on Guilty Verdicts
100
90

% Guilty Verdicts

80
70
60
50
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Superseding
Totality

30
20
10
0
Negative
Positive
Attitudes Toward Police

Figure 4. Line graph depicting the effects of jurors’ attitudes toward police, and the content of
jury instructions, on guilty verdicts in a fatal police use of force trial.
Note. Results from all conditions are depicted. Verdicts in the Control and Superseding Moment
conditions were nearly indistinguishable.
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Figure 5. Path diagram depicting the results of a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2017)
with the control group serving as reference.
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Figure 6. Path diagram depicting the results of a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2017)
with the superseding moment group serving as reference.
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TABLES
Table 1
Overall Sample Demographics (N = 539)

Variable

N

Age

535

Gender

535

%

Male

43.9

Female

55.9

Other

0.2

Education

535

No High School Degree

0.7

High School/GED

11.6

Some College

29.5

Graduate/Prof. Degree

44.3

Political Ideology

534

Liberal

48.8

Moderate

16.4

Conservative

34.9

Living Environment

535

Urban

25.6

Suburban

52.3

Rural

22.1

Police Interactions

535

Yes

33.6

No

66.4

69

M

SD

43.13

13.96

Table 2
Means for Continuous Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator Across
Experimental Conditions (N = 539)
Overall

Control

Superseding

Totality

(N = 539)

(N = 192)

(N = 173)

(N = 174)

Range

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Degree of Guilt

1-7

4.46

2.07

4.46

2.08

4.48

2.12

4.45

2.03

Prosecution Evidence

1-5

3.70

.96

3.74

1.04

3.73

.93

3.64

.94

Perspective-Taking

1-7

5.98

1.17

5.97

1.21

6.0

1.15

5.91

1.14

Attitudes

1-7

3.47

.90

3.45

.90

3.45

.94

3.50

.85

Measure

Notes. Degree of guilt was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = Definitely not guilty, 7 = Definitely
guilty). The importance of prosecution evidence was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = Extremely
important, 5 = Not at all important). Prosecution items were recoded such that lower scores
indicated the importance of prosecution evidence. Perspective-taking was measured on a 7-point
scale (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree) and was recoded such that higher scores indicated
higher perspective-taking. Positive attitudes toward police were measured on a 5-point scale (1 =
Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree), with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes
toward police.
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Table 3
Correlations Among Dependent Measures, Mediators, and the Moderator (N = 539)

Notes. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Guilt was measured as a continuous
variable and was averaged, with higher scores indicating higher confidence in guilt. Gender was
coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women. Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged.
Participant race was dummy coded with White participants serving as the reference group.
Political orientation was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged, with higher scores
indicating more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and
averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was
dummy coded with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent
interactions with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of
prosecution evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and
averaged with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 4
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions
on Dichotomous Verdicts with Control Instructions as Reference Group

Notes. Verdict was coded 1 = Guilty, 0 = Not Guilty. Gender was coded 1 = Men, 0 = Women.
Age was measured as a continuous variable and was averaged. Participant race was dummy
coded with White participants serving as the reference group. Political orientation was measured
as a continuous variable and was averaged, and then mean-centered with higher scores indicating
more conservative viewpoints. Education was measured as a continuous variable and averaged
with higher scores indicating higher levels of education. Living environment was dummy coded
with participants in the Suburban category serving as the reference group. Recent interactions
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with police were coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Attitudes toward police, importance of prosecution
evidence, and perspective-taking were measured as continuous variables and was averaged, and
then mean-centered with higher scores indicating a higher presence of the construct.
Standardized odds ratios (OR) represent OR when standardized attitude scores are used.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 5
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions
on Dichotomous Verdicts with Superseding Moment Instructions as Indicator

Notes. Step 1 results and categorical variable coding are the same as reflected in Table 4.
Standardized odds ratios (OR) represent OR when standardized attitude scores are used.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 6
Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions
on Continuous Guilt Ratings with Control Instructions as Indicator
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

Age

-.01

.01

-.07

.00

.01

-.01

.00

.01

.05

Male

-.07

.17

-.02

-.05

.17

-.01

-.05

.17

-.01

Black

1.03**

.31

.14

.72*

.30

.10

.72*

.30

.10

Hispanic

.03

.45

.00

.02

.44

.00

.03

.44

.00

Education

-.08

.10

-.03

-.05

.10

-.02

-.05

.10

-.02

-.28**

.05

-.25 -.17**

.05

-.15

-.17**

.05

-.15

Urban

.13

.21

.03

.13

.20

.03

.13

.20

.03

Rural

.20

.23

.04

.22

.22

.04

.22

.22

.05

Recent Interactions

.26

.19

.06

.21

.18

.05

.21

.18

-.01

-.04

.17

-.01

-.17

.17

-.04

-.17

.17

-.04

-.67**

.10

-.29 -.64 **

.16

-.28

Superseding

.02

.20

.01

.02

.20

.01

Totality

.03

.20

.01

.03

.20

.01

-.05

.22

-.01

-.06

.23

-.02

Variable
Step 1

Political Ideology

Counterbalancing
Step 2
Attitudes

Step 3
Attitudes *
Superseding
Attitudes * Totality
R²

.102

.169

.169

F for change in R²

6.64

8.84

7.56

Notes. Coding of categorical variables is the same as Table 4. * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 7
Hierarchical Linear Regression Results for Moderating Effects of Attitudes and Instructions
on Continuous Guilt Ratings with Superseding Moment Instructions as Indicator
Model 2
Variable

B

SE B

Model 3
β

B

SE B

β

Step 2
Attitudes

-.67**

.10

-.30

-.68**

.16

-.30

Control

-.02

.20

-.01

-.02

.20

-.01

Totality

.01

.21

.00

.13

.21

.00

Attitudes * Control

.01

.22

.01

Attitudes * Totality

-.01

.21

.00

Step 3

R²
F for change in R²

.169
8.84

.169
7.56

Notes. Coding of categorical variables is the same as Table 4. Step 1 results are the same as
reflected in Table 6.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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APPENDIX A
ELIGIBILITY AND CONSENT
You are being asked to complete this survey because we are interested in jurors’ decisions
in criminal trials. Please read this form before agreeing to participate.
1. The purpose of this research is to investigate opinions about court cases.
2. If you agree to participate, you were asked to view a presentation of a court case including
summaries of evidence and testimony and then to complete a questionnaire assessing your
opinions about the case.
3. Your participation will take no more than 35 minutes.
4. The information we collect were used solely for research purposes. The data were collected
and analyzed by the researchers in aggregate form. Although anonymity cannot be guaranteed, as
with any academic research, your answers are strictly confidential and the data will not contain
any information that can be used to uniquely identify you or your individual responses.
5. All information collected as part of this research were stored on a secure server. We will take
all reasonable steps to protect your identity and will not even record your name as a participant,
so there is no way your name will ever be linked to your survey responses. Thus, your answers
will remain completely confidential and your data were stored in a completely confidential
manner.
6. Participation in this study involves the risk of some psychological discomfort. You may view
evidence from an actual shooting event that resulted in death. However, this would not be more
upsetting than anything you could see in movies, online, or on the news. Although there are no
direct benefits to you for participating, the information you provide will help improve our
understanding of legal reasoning, which advances social psychological research.
7. Your participation is completely voluntary. You may withdraw at any time without
consequence.
8. By participating in this study, you will have the opportunity to earn credits on Mechanical
Turk.
9.
This study is being conducted by Chasity Ratliff at Southern Illinois University. If you
have questions, you may contact the researchers at (573)270-9381 or chasity.ratliff@siu.edu.
10. This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Compliance, Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale, IL 62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4534. E-mail siuhsc@siu.edu
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. By clicking “I understand
and wish to continue” below, I indicate that I agree to participate in this research.
To begin, please answer these questions:
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Are you 18 years or older?
o Yes
o No
Are you a United States Citizen?
o Yes
o No
*If the participant is younger than 18 or is not a U.S. citizen, they will see the following
prompt:
Thank you for your interest in completing this research study. However, participation in this
study is restricted to United States citizens who are 18 years or older.
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APPENDIX B
ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICE
Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Police generally make fair and
impartial decisions in the cases
they deal with.
Police give people the
opportunity to tell their side of
the story before making any
decisions.
Police make decisions based
upon the law and not their
personal opinions or biases.
When the police deal with
people they almost always
behave according to the law.
Police have great respect for
people’s rights.
Police often arrest people for no
good reason.
Police stand up for values that
are important to me.
I generally support how the
police act in my community.
Police usually act in ways
consistent with my own ideas
about what is right and wrong.
Items adapted from Jackson, J., Trinkner, R., & Tyler, T. (2018). Bounded authority:
expanding appropriate police behavior beyond procedural justice. Law and Human
Behavior, 42(3), 280-293.
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APPENDIX C
PRE-TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the three following sets of instructions.
CONTROL:
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer. The officer is now
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the
evidence presented at trial.
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence.
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function
in the criminal justice system.
The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt.
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those
facts to the law as it is given to you. That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not
Guilty.” In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence
exhibits, and witness testimony. At the end of the trial you will receive additional, detailed
instructions.
SUPERSEDING MOMENT:
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer. The officer is now
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the
evidence presented at trial.
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence.
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function
in the criminal justice system.
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The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt.
It is important to understand that police officers are permitted to use lethal force under some
circumstances. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
With respect to a claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those
facts to the law as it is given to you. That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not
Guilty.” In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence
exhibits, and witness testimony. At the end of the trial you will receive additional, detailed
instructions.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE:
You will read the summary of an actual criminal trial involving a white police officer who
shot a white suspect for failing to comply with orders from the officer. The officer is now
on trial for using lethal force against the suspect. You will play the role of a jury member in
this case, which means you will have to make a legal decision based on the law and on the
evidence presented at trial.
These are the pre-evidence instructions the judge gives to the jury in these cases. Please
read them carefully as they are very important to your understanding of the trial evidence.
You will also receive detailed instructions at the end of the trial.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: You have been selected to perform a very important function
in the criminal justice system.
The indictment charges the defendant, Mike Smith, with first-degree murder in the death of
Shawn Davis. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment is simply the formal way of
telling the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It is not evidence that the
defendant is guilty. It does not even raise a suspicion of guilt. It is important to understand that
police officers are permitted to use lethal force under some circumstances. The reasonableness of
a particular use of force depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Factors
you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was unreasonable include,
without limitation:
The need for the force used;
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;
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The extent of the victim’s injury;
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;
The severity of the crime at issue;
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;
Whether warning was given;
Whether the victim was actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if
the victim was attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably
appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.
It is your duty as jurors to review the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those
facts to the law as it is given to you. That is how you will reach your verdict of “Guilty” or “Not
Guilty.” In doing so you must follow that law whether you agree with it or not. Throughout the
trial, you were presented with statements from prosecution and defense attorneys, evidence
exhibits, and witness testimony. At the end of the trial you will receive additional, detailed
instructions.
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APPENDIX D
TRIAL STIMULUS
OPENING STATEMENTS:
PROSECUTOR: Angela Woods
On the night in question, February 5, 2018, Officer Joseph Collins and his partner were
dispatched to investigate a report of a man—later identified as Shawn Davis—who was stealing
from trucks. Officers located Shawn Davis and approached him, ordering him to stop and take
his hands out of his pockets. Shawn Davis turned, walked away and took both hands out of his
pockets, displaying a small knife in his right hand. Joseph Collins drew his weapon and ordered
Shawn Davis to drop the knife, but Shawn Davis continued walking away. Officer Joseph
Collins didn’t shoot though, he continued to follow Shawn Davis on foot. Another officer—Stan
Bogan—followed in the police cruiser while the police dispatcher requested a police unit with a
Taser.
Now, to be clear, as Officer Bogan was attempting to use the police cruiser to direct Shawn
Davis, Davis did strike the windshield and popped the squad car tire with his knife. But, ladies
and gentlemen, the damage was minimal. The officers on the scene did not feel the need to fire
their weapons, they already had a plan in place. Like I said, dispatch had already called for a unit
with a Taser and they were in route. Every officer in this area has access to that radio frequency
and would have been able to hear this.
Now, this is when Officers Dale Seabaugh and Mike Smith—the defendant—arrived on the
scene. Ladies and gentlemen, Mike Smith got out of the vehicle with his gun drawn. Not long
after, he opened fire 16 times. Smith emptied his magazine while Shawn Davis was surrounded
by squad cars and while a Taser unit was near. There was also a chain link fence six to seven feet
tall preventing Shawn Davis from escaping police, and there were no pedestrians nearby. Mike
Smith abused his power as a police officer that night and committed murder when he shot Shawn
Davis.
DEFENSE: Martin Montgomery
The evidence in this case is going to show that Officer Mike Smith is not a murderer, but a
reasonable police officer who feared for his life and the life of others while serving in the line of
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duty that night. Furthermore, the evidence will demonstrate that Officer Smith acted within his
training when he fired his weapon at what he perceived to be a dangerous suspect coming toward
him with a deadly weapon.
Now, I just want to give you a little more context on Shawn Davis and why the police were there
in the first place. The police received a call that Shawn Davis was stealing from trucks inside a
secured lot and what the prosecution didn’t tell you is that Shawn Davis had threatened the driver
who discovered him with a knife. Then, when the officers initially came into contact with Shawn
Davis, he brandished the same knife—a deadly weapon—at the officers and disobeyed orders to
drop the knife, causing Officer Collins to draw his weapon.
As you will see, Shawn Davis continued on his path of destruction when he struck the
windshield and punctured the tires of a squad car when the police were attempting to confront
and contain him. Then, as more police units arrived on the scene, Shawn Davis flicked out his
knife and took off running near busy restaurants full of innocent civilians who would have been
put at risk.
Shawn Davis had already brandished his weapon toward police officers and violently damaged a
police cruiser, so Officer Smith reasonably concluded that Shawn Davis was planning an attack
at this point in his wild rampage. In the moment he fired his weapon, Smith was reasonably
afraid based on Shawn Davis’s behavior, and he was focused on a threat to himself, his fellow
officers, and to innocent civilians. That threat was Shawn Davis. Officer Smith acted in
accordance with his training and instincts to protect himself and others from the serious threat
posed by Shawn Davis.
Prosecution Evidence and Witnesses
Evidence: map of area, coroner’s report, Still photos from dashcam
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Prosecution Witnesses:
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Althea Groves: Police dispatcher who called for a Taser unit
Summary of Testimony: Ms. Groves confirmed that she made the call for a unit with a Taser to
assist at the intersection where Shawn Davis was walking with the knife. She also verified that
everyone with a working police radio should have heard the call for a Taser unit.
Joseph Collins: Officer who followed Shawn Davis on foot
Summary of Testimony: The officer testified that he followed Shawn Davis on foot for blocks
but he never felt his life was in danger. Officer Collins drew his gun after Shawn Davis displayed
a knife but was careful to keep his distance from him. "We were trying to buy time to have a
Taser. He didn't make any direct movement at me, and I felt like my partner was protected for
the most part inside the vehicle," he said. "It was kind of like organized chaos. We were just
trying to be patient."
John Patrick: Police medical examiner
Summary of Testimony: Dr. Patrick reviewed the coroner’s report and testified that Shawn
Davis died as the result of multiple gunshot wounds. “Shawn Davis died as the result of 16
distinct gunshot entry wounds to his scalp, neck, chest, arms, back, and his right leg.”
Samuel Burns: Law enforcement educator
Summary of Testimony: Mr. Burns reviewed a dashcam video. “Unfortunately, the dashcam
video is very poor quality, but as you can see in the progression of these screenshots, Shawn
Davis appeared to be walking away from police in an unthreatening manner in an area absent of
other pedestrians or bystanders. It seems unreasonable for the officer to have fired one, let alone
16, shots into this man. He should have tried to de-escalate the situation instead of firing his
weapon.”
Under cross-examination from the defense: Mr. Burns conceded that it was plausible
for Shawn Davis to run into the nearby Burger King or Dunkin Donuts with his knife in
hand.
Defense Evidence and Witnesses
Evidence: Photos of damage to squad car, Map including Burger King and Dunkin Donuts, 911
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audio

AUDIO:
http://bit.ly/1mgPjbo "I have a parking lot for trucks. I have a guy right here that is (stealing)
the radios."
—911 caller

Defense Witnesses:
Dale Seabaugh: Mike Smith’s partner the night of shooting
Summary of Testimony: The officer testified that he was concerned Shawn Davis would enter
the nearby restaurants and injure people inside. “This guy had been stealing and terrorizing
people with a knife. I mean, he had already punctured the tire on a police cruiser, so I was
worried that he might go into the Burger King or Dunkin Donuts and hurt people in there.”
Nathan Miller: Police psychologist and law enforcement educator
Summary of testimony: Dr. Miller testified that police recruits are explicitly taught that knives
are deadly weapons that can pierce their bulletproof vests and that someone with a knife can
close a distance of 21 feet in less than two seconds. Their police training at the academy always
includes knives as dangerous, deadly weapons. "Officer Mike Smith responded to what he
perceived was a deadly threat, responded in a way based on his training, in a way that was
designated to neutralize that threat as he understood it."
Mike Smith: Defendant on trial
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Summary of Testimony: Smith testified as he got out of the car that night, he saw Shawn Davis
"extend out a knife, flicking it toward his side."
"His face had no expression. His eyes were just bugging out of his head. He had these huge eyes
just staring right through me. I was yelling at him drop the knife, I was yelling at him I don't
know how many times. He got probably about 10 to 15 feet away from me.”
"We never lost eye contact. He turned his torso towards me. ... It looked like he waved the knife
from his lower right side, upwards across his body towards my left shoulder. Those pictures
don’t show my perspective. I felt like he was coming toward me, threatening me with that knife.
Everything was happening so quickly, and I had to make a decision to shoot him or get stabbed,
so I shot him."
CLOSING STATEMENTS
PROSECUTION: The defendant didn’t have to end Shawn Davis’ life that night, ladies and
gentlemen. He could have hit him with the car door or tapped him with the front of his squad car.
He could have checked on how soon the Taser would arrive. Yes, someone needed to arrest
Shawn Davis for damaging a police cruiser and to question him about breaking into vehicles. But
Mike Smith did not need to stop him with a hail of gunfire. That’s not self-defense. That’s not
fear for personal safety, that is murder.
DEFENSE: At any point throughout his wild rampage that night, Shawn Davis could have
dropped the knife and he would be here today. It is unprecedented for a police officer to be
charged with murder for doing his job. Officer Mike Smith had no motive, no malice, and no
premeditation. You can use your common sense, ladies and gentlemen. You can determine what
is a murder. This wasn’t murder, this was an officer doing his duty to protect himself, his fellow
officers, and innocent civilians.
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APPENDIX E
POST-TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions in both the superseding moment and totality of circumstance conditions will also
contain the instructions from the control condition.
CONTROL:
DIRECTIONS: The following are the judge’s final instructions. Please read every word and
pay close attention as these instructions are very complex. It is very important that you read
through these very carefully and understand them before delivering a verdict.
THE JUDGE’S INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU, THE JURY
Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the facts from the evidence in this case and to
apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. Faithful
performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the administration of justice. The defendant, Mike
Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.
A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm;
OR
2) knew that such acts would result in death;
OR
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty.
SUPERSEDING:
Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the facts from the evidence in this case and to
apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you. Faithful
performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the administration of justice.
Police officers are lawfully justified in using deadly force under some circumstances. The
reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With respect to a claim of
excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
The defendant, Mike Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.
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A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm;
OR
2) knew that such acts would result in death;
OR
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE: Members of the jury, it is your duty to determine the
facts from the evidence in this case and to apply the law to the facts. Neither sympathy nor
prejudice should influence you. Faithful performance of your duties as jurors is vital to the
administration of justice.
Police officers are lawfully justified in using deadly force under some circumstances. The
reasonableness of a particular use of force depends on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. Factors you may consider in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force was
unreasonable include, without limitation:
The need for the force used;
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;
The extent of the victim’s injury;
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;
The severity of the crime at issue;
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;
Whether warning was given;
Whether the victim was actively resisting arrest or was attempting to evade arrest by fleeing, if
the victim was attempting to escape or evade arrest by use of a deadly weapon or if it reasonably
appeared that he was posing a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.
The defendant, Mike Smith, is charged with first-degree murder.
A person commits the offense of first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful
justification AND, in performing the acts that caused the death, he:
1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm;
OR
2) knew that such acts would result in death;
OR
3) knew that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
The defendant is presumed innocent of the charge of first-degree murder. This presumption is
not overcome unless, from all the evidence in this case, you are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty.
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APPENDIX F
DEPENDENT MEASURES
As a jury member, would you find the defendant GUILTY or NOT GUILTY
o Not Guilty
o Guilty
Please select the option that best expresses your opinion about whether the defendant
should be found GUILTY or NOT GUILTY.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Definitely not guilty
Not guilty
Probably not guilty
Unsure
Probably guilty
Guilty
Definitely guilty

Please briefly describe why you found the defendant GUILTY or NOT GUILTY.
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APPENDIX G
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
Below, you will see brief summaries of information presented by prosecution and defense
witnesses during the trial. For each, please indicate how important the testimony was in helping
you reach your verdict decision.
None at
A little Moderately
Very
Extremely
all
important important important important
important
Officer Joseph Collins followed
Shawn Davis on foot for blocks
and did not feel his life was in
danger.
Every officer knew that a Taser
unit was on the way.
Shawn Davis was shot 16 times.
The dashcam photos appeared
to show Shawn Davis walking
away from the officer.
According to a law enforcement
educator, Officer Mike Smith
should have tried to de-escalate
the situation.
Shawn Davis had been stealing
and threatening people with a
knife.
Shawn Davis had already
damaged a police cruiser with a
knife.
Officer Mike Smith’s was
trained that knives are deadly
weapons that can pierce
bulletproof vests and someone
with a knife can close a distance
of 21 feet in less than two
seconds.
Officer Dale Seabaugh feared
that Shawn Davis would injure
people in nearby restaurants.
Officer Mike Smith believed he
was being threatened with a
deadly weapon.
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APPENDIX H
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

I tried to imagine how I
would feel if I were in the
officer’s place.
I tried to imagine what I
would think if I were in
the officer’s place.
I tried to imagine how
things looked from the
officer’s perspective.
Items adapted from Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence
for a multidimensional approach. Journal of personality and social psychology, 44(1), 113.
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APPENDIX I
MEMORY FOR CASE FACTS
Please indicate whether each of the following statements are TRUE or FALSE according to the
evidence that was presented.
Officer Joseph Collins (a prosecution witness) testified that Shawn Davis did not make
any direct movements toward him while he followed Davis on foot.
Sam Burns (a prosecution witness) testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking
away when he was shot by Mike Smith.
Mike Smith (the defendant) testified that he repeatedly instructed Shawn Davis to “drop
the knife and get down on the ground before I shoot.”
Shawn Davis popped a tire on a police cruiser with a knife.

T/F

Nathan Miller (a defense witness) testified that Shawn Davis appeared to be walking
toward the officers.
The coroner’s report identified 13 entry wounds

T/F

Nathan Miller (a defense witness) testified that police recruits are taught that knives are
deadly weapons
Althea Groves (a prosecution witness) testified that some of the police officers working
that night may not have heard the dispatch call for a taser.

T/F
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T/F
T/F
T/F

T/F

T/F

APPENDIX J
MANIPULATION CHECK
Please answer the following questions about the jury instructions you were given before
making your verdict decision.
Did the instructions include the following statement?
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. With respect to a
claim of excessive force, the standard of reasonableness at the moment applies.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
o Yes
o No
Did the instructions inform you that you could consider the following factors when making
your verdict decision?
The need for the force used;
The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;
The extent of the victim’s injury;
Any efforts made by the defendant to temper or limit the amount of force;
The severity of the crime at issue;
The threat reasonably perceived by the officer;
Whether warning was given;
o Yes
o No
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APPENDIX K
CONCEPTUAL MANIPULATION CHECK
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

The jury instructions encouraged
me to rely on my own attitudes
and beliefs to determine
reasonableness.
The jury instructions encouraged
me to rely on an objective
standard to determine
reasonableness.
The jury instructions guided me
to focus on the very split-second
when the officer used fatal force.
The jury instructions guided me
to focus on all of the facts and
circumstances that occurred
before and after the officer used
fatal force.
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Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

APPENDIX L
SUSPICION ITEM

What do you think the study was about? There is no right or wrong answer, we just want to know
what your thoughts were as you were taking the study.
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APPENDIX M
DEMOGRAPHICS
Please indicate your age in years as a 2-digit number (e.g., 29).

Please indicate your gender.
o Male
o Female
o Other
Please indicate your race/ethnicity – check all that apply:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
African American
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White
Other

What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?
o
o
o
o
o

No high school degree
High school or GED
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree

When it comes to your stance on social issues, are you…
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely Liberal
Mostly Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Moderate
Slightly Conservative
Mostly Conservative
Extremely Conservative
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***If “Moderate” is selected, participants will see the following:
Do you lean towards liberal or conservative when it comes to social issues?
o Lean toward Liberal
o Neutral or Uncertain
o Lean toward Conservative

What is your occupation?

Zip Code:

How would you describe your living environment?
o Urban
o Suburban
o Rural

Have you interacted with a police officer(s) in the last 12 months?
o Yes
o No
• If participants select ‘yes’ they will see:
Please indicate how positive or negative you would rate your interaction(s):
o
o
o
o
o

Very negative
Negative
Neither negative nor positive
Positive
Very positive
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APPENDIX N
DEBRIEFING
Thank you for participating in this study. We would like to explain more about its
purpose. It is probably obvious that we are interested in examining people’s perceptions about
police-involved shootings. We are also interested in exploring how different types of jury
instructions influence the outcomes in cases involving excessive use of force. You may have
read jury instructions that guided you to consider only the moments preceding the shooting,
instructions guiding you to consider the totality of circumstance regarding the police use of
force, both, or neither.
We chose to manipulate the type of instructions you were given because social psychological
research has demonstrated that the type of instructions provided to jurors affects verdict
outcomes (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017).
Additionally, only recently have police officers been charged with using excessive force and it is
important to understand why jurors may or may not find the officer guilty.
We want to remind you that all data and resulting analyses associated with this study were nonidentifiable, and were managed to protect your privacy.
Finally, if you were emotionally upset by any of the contents of this study, we suggest that
you seek professional guidance in processing the experience.
Please contact us if you have any questions.
Thank you for your participation in this study.
Contact for further information:
Chasity Ratliff, M.A.
chasity.ratliff@siu.edu
Liana Peter-Hagene, PhD
claudia.peter-hagene@siu.edu
Click NEXT to receive your confirmation code to be compensated.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Compliance, Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale, IL 62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4534. E-mail: siuhsc@siu.edu
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